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INTRODUCTION
The European Community ("EC")' has faced significant
challenges in completing the internal market.2 Chief among them has
been the task of creating a single market in financial services, which
requires the harmonization of European Union ("E.U.") Member
State laws that govern the operation of national securities markets.3
The principles of proportionality and subsidiarity,4 which limit the
1. Because this Comment is concerned solely with measures to harmonize
internal market securities legislation of the States Parties to the Treaty Establishing
the European Community ("EC Treaty"), this Comment will refer to action under
the EC Treaty as action by the European Community ("EC") rather than the
European Union ("E.U."). General references to supranational bodies, however,
will be to the E.U. rather than the EC. Cf NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES
REGULATION 5 n.6 (2002) (distinguishing among actions taken under the EC pillar
and under other pillars of the E.U.).
2. See Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, at 4,
4-7, COM (1985) 310 final (June 1985) [hereinafter 1985 White Paper]
(discussing the fact that measures to integrate the internal market stalled in the late
1970s after common customs tariffs were implemented because of the proliferation
of non-tariff barriers in E.U. Member States).
3. See Eddy Wymeersch, The Harmonisation of Securities Regulation in
Europe in the New Trading Environment 1 (Fin. Law Inst., Universiteit Gent,
Working Paper No. WP 2000-16, 2000), available at http://www.law.ugent.be
/fli/WP/WP2000-pdf/wp2000-16.pdf [hereinafter Wymeersch Working Paper]
(stating that the poor integration of European stock exchanges is the Achilles heel
of EC capital market integration). Compare Emilios Avgouleas, A Critical
Evalution of the New EC Financial-MarketRegulation: Peaks, Troughs, and the
Road Ahead, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW 179, 224-29 (2005) (suggesting that enhanced
EC-level securities regulation would serve as a complement to the financial market
integration already accomplished by the European Monetary Union ("EMU")),
with Rosa M. Lastra, Regulating European Securities Markets: Beyond the

Lamfalussy Report, in

FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A SINGLE

211 (Mads Andenas & Yannis Avgerinos eds., 2003) (suggesting
that harmonization of E.U. Member State securities markets is a necessary
precondition for exploiting the full potential of the EMU).
REGULATOR?

4. See PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: FROM THE TREATY
OF ROME TO THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 76-80 (Patrick Del Duca trans., Kluwer
Law International 2d ed. 1999) (1992) (discussing Protocol (30) on the Application
of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality that was attached to EC Treaty
by the Treaty of Amsterdam and arguing that the problem of the subsidiarity
principle is not whether the EC may take action, but rather pursuant to which
Treaty competence should the EC state that it is taking action). See generally
LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

79-81 (2004) (arguing

that the subsidiarity principle does divide legislative powers between the E.U. and
E.U. Member States, but that the principle as worded in Article 5 EC is susceptible
of multiple interpretations).

390

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[23:387

power of the E.U. to enact legislation binding on Member States, has
complicated the task of harmonizing Member State securities laws
because the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty")5 does not provide the E.U. an unequivocal competence for
creating a unified European securities market.6 The process of
harmonizing securities regulation has not met with particular
success,7 and reforms of the E.U. legislative framework for
constructing a single market in financial services are still underway.8
Inconsistent implementation at the national level of EC financial
markets directives has significantly limited regulatory convergence
in EC securities markets. 9
In this Comment, I evaluate the role of cooperative arrangements
between securities regulatory authorities in Europe in facilitating the
harmonization of Member State securities law.1" Specifically, I
analyze what Professor Eddy Wymeersch has termed "contractually
organized supervision" for the regulation of multi-jurisdictional
financial market participants in E.U. Member States. 1" In Part II, I

5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
reprinted in Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on the European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325)
33 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
6. See infra Part I.D (discussing the EC Treaty mandate to create a "common
market").
7. See Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets 7-18 (Feb. 15, 2001), availableat http://ec.europa.eu!
intemalmarket/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-menen.pdf
[hereinafter Final Lamfalussy Report] (sounding alarm at the fact that the E.U.'s
framework for adopting legislation in the field of securities regulation was rigid,
complicated, and poorly tooled for responding to the pace of change in
contemporary global financial markets).
8. See European Commission, Internal Market and Services Directorate
General, FSAP Evaluation Part I: Process and Implementation 9-11 (Jan. 24,
2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/finances/docs/actionplan
/index/070124_part l_en.pdf (stating that the extent of success of Levels 3 and 4 of
the Lamfalussy Process is not yet clear because legislation adopted pursuant to the
Lamfalussy Process is still in the stages of implementation).
9. See FinalLamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 13-14.
10. To limit the scope of discussion in this complicated area of regulation this
Comment will focus on EC legislation pertaining to the regulation of trading
markets.
11. See Wymeersch Working Paper, supra note 3,
3 ("Multiplicity of
supervision therefore co-exists with a [sic] certain forms of co-ordination. A whole
body of rules and practices has sprung from this approach, leading to new forms of
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outline the market context in which intra-European and transatlantic
regulatory cooperation is taking place. In Part III, I analyze the
trading market rule harmonization framework of the Memorandum
of Understanding on the Supervision, Regulation, and Oversight of
the Euronext Group ("Euronext Regulatory MOU") 2 and I evaluate
the relationship of the cooperative arrangement to EC securities
legislation. In Part IV of this Comment, I offer three suggestions for
incorporating the positive attributes of the Euronext Regulatory
MOU into EC supervisory practice.

I. BACKGROUND
Technology, demutualization, and regulatory reorganization have
a significant impact on the emerging structure of securities
exchanges globally. 3 The debates regarding the future of regulatory
cooperation in light of the merger of the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") and the Euronext securities exchanges make the influence
of these phenomena on the regulatory dynamic undeniable.
Regulatory cooperation and convergence can take many forms,
however, and the E.U. has struggled to adopt an approach to the
convergence of E.U. Member State securities regulation that
achieves convergence efficiently and ensures high standards of
regulation without adopting legislation that strays beyond the EC
4
internal market competence.

'contractually' organised supervision, that clearly go beyond the minimum norms
laid down in the directives and in the regulations of the states involved.").
12. Memorandum of Understanding on Supervision, Regulation, and Oversight
of the Euronext Group, Mar. 22, 2001, available at http://www.amffrance.org/documents/general/3622_ 1.pdf [hereinafter
Euronext Regulatory
MOU].

13. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74
L. REv. 2541, 2566-67 (2006) (identifying that the forces of
deregulation, technology, and globalization have led to an increase in competition
among stock markets at the international level and noting that globalization is the
strongest of the three forces).
14. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 2, 3(c), 14. The authority of E.U.
institutions to legislate in the financial services area derives at its most basic level
from Articles 2 and 3(c) of the EC Treaty. See generally MOLONEY, supra note 1,
at 5-8 (discussing the EC Treaty internal market competence as applied to
securities markets). Article 2 sets the task of establishing a common market and
economic and monetary union, while Article 3 states that the common market
should be free of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
FORDHAM
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A. THE RAPID CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN
SECURITIES MARKETS REQUIRE A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO
REGULATION

The transformation

the contemporary

securities

industry is

undergoing is the result of the related phenomena of trade
automation and demutualization. 5 The combined effect of these

developments has significant consequences for the path that EC
harmonization efforts must take because the basic purpose of
regulation is to countervail market failures 6 and securities markets

are changing dramatically, particularly in the E.U. States. 7 Because
capital. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 2, 3(c). Article 14 further elaborates that
the common market should be an "area without internal frontiers" and that the free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital should be ensured through
Community action. See id. art. 14.
15. See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and
Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 367, 370-73 (2002) (arguing that demutualization is a response to the
increased competition that resulted from the deregulation wave of the 1980s and
thus that the consolidation and internationalization phenomena that we are
witnessing in contemporary capital markets has roots in deregulation); see also
Eilis Ferran, Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the Single
FinancialRegulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257, 257 (2003) (evaluating the
trend towards consolidation into one agency of regulatory authority over financial
services in the insurance, banking, and securities sectors).
16. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 298-300 (discussing the market failure
rationale in the context of the EC Investment Services Directive ("ISD")). Market
failure occurs when transactions that take place in an unregulated marketplace do
not increase social welfare-i.e. the unregulated market yields a "deadweight
loss." See id But see Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the
Limits of International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 217-18 (2005)
(cautioning that market failure alone does not justify government regulation,
particularly when such regulation is applied across borders, since regulation has
costs as well and a regulatory regime might itself yield a deadweight loss); Roberta
Romano, The Need For Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387, 543-45 (2001) (criticizing United States' mandatory
disclosure regime as decreasing social welfare in scenarios where disclosure is not
justified under a cost-benefit analysis). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L.
REV. 717, 717 (1984) (discussing the history of the debate in the United States
regarding the desirability of a mandatory securities disclosure system and arguing
that a mandatory disclosure system is justified because information regarding
issuers' financial condition suffers from a classic public good problem).
17. See Commission White Paper on FinancialServices Policy 2005-2010, at
8,
3.1 COM (2005) 629 final (Dec. 5, 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/finances/docs/white-paper/white-paper-en.pdf
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regulatory regimes essentially define the shape that a market can
take,' 8 the securities regime that the E.U. is constructing must prove
sufficiently flexible that the securities industry can continue to adapt
technology to securities transactions and provide innovative
products. "9

Demutualization occurs when the membership of a traditional nonprofit organization that operates a stock exchange reorganizes the
exchange as a for-profit institution, generally as a response to
increased competition.2" The phenomenon of demutualization is not

(stating that European securities market participants are increasingly organizing
their activities on a pan-European scale). European securities exchanges are on par
with if not more advanced than United States markets in terms of adapting
technology to securities trading. See Norman S. Poser, Automation of Securities
Markets and the European Community's Proposed Investment Services Directive,
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 33-35 (1992) (noting that United States

exchanges failed to adapt technology to trading as quickly as the London
exchanges despite the fact that deregulation in the United States originally was a
catalyst for deregulation in Europe, which then brought pressure to bear on the
European exchanges to employ technology to lower their costs and compete
effectively); see also Marc Pagano & Benn Steil, Equity Trading I: The Evolution
of European Trading Systems, in THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: THE STATE OF
THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MILLENNIUM 4-9 (Benn Steil et al. eds.,
European Capital Markets Institute 1996) (discussing the role that the London
Stock Exchange ("LSE") has played in spurring the restructuring of European
continental exchanges).
18. See Poser, supra note 17, at 29 (stating that the provisions of the ISD would
determine what role technology could play in harmonized securities markets). The
ISD, however, was repealed by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
because, inter alia, the ISD was not able to provide for regulation of new
technologies that came into being after its enactment. See Council Directive
2004/39, arts. 2-3, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Markets in Fin.
Instruments Directive] (noting that the EC should develop a legal framework to
"encompass the full range of investor-oriented activities").
19. See Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The
Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through
Mutual Recognition and Safe HarborAgreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 53-54
(2002) (arguing that "top-down" regulatory approaches are inappropriate for the
regulation of markets characterized by rapid change and complexity).
20. See Fleckner, supra note 13, at 2558-59 (discussing demutualization of
traditional "open outcry" exchanges as a response to the rapid growth of electronic
communication networks ("ECN")); see also Karmel, supra note 15, at 368-69
(suggesting that, prior to the demutualization wave, the lack of competition among
exchanges and the favorable regulatory environment made it rational for the
members of non-profit exchanges to continue to operate the exchanges as non-
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limited to the U.S. securities markets-the majority of global
equities exchanges already have demutualized. 2' The most recent
demutualization to occur in the United States is that of the NYSE,
which began in December 2005 with the elimination of private
trading in NYSE memberships, 2 and which reached a conclusion on
March 8, 2006 when the NYSE entered into a reverse-merger
arrangement for its combination with Archipelago. 23 Demutualization
has proceeded at a faster pace in Europe.24
It is important to place these phenomena in context, however. The
current wave of trade automation and demutualization is part of a
larger cycle of deregulation, technological adaptation, and
reregulation, which leads to heightened competition and, thus, a new
wave of automation.25 In the securities markets, reregulation is the
phenomenon whereby a regulatory authority modifies its rules to
cope with the new technologies that exchanges adopt in a
deregulated environment.26 Because deregulation is a response to

profit organizations because the income generated by the exchanges redounded to

the members through lowered access fees).
21. See Roel C. Campos, Comm'r, SEC, Regulatory Role of Exchanges and
International Implications of Demutualization (Mar. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch03l006rcc.htm (stating that seventeen stock
exchanges throughout the world have demutualized since 1987 and that

demutualization poses significant challenges for securities regulators).
22. See Gene Colter, NYSE Closes Its Books and Folds Up Its Seats To Start
Life as a For-ProfitExchange, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2005, at B3.
23. See Aaron Lucchetti et al., NYSE to Acquire Electronic Trader And Go
Public, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2005, at Al; see also HEMENDRA ARAN & ALPESH
B. PATEL, GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS REVOLUTION 176-77 (2006) (discussing

the structure of Archipelago prior to its merger with the NYSE).
24. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 368 (noting that the first stock exchange to
demutualize was the Stockholm Stock Exchange in Sweden); Fleckner, supra note
13, at 2555-56 (noting that SEC statements and some case law suggested that the
Securities Exchange Act required U.S. exchanges to have a "traditional
membership structure").
25. See Manning Gilbert Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws:
The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 185, 187

(1990) (distinguishing two types of regulatory changes in financial services in the
1980s: access deregulation and prudential reregulation). Access deregulation refers
to the removal of regulations that restrict the movement of capital, thus increasing
the scarcity and price of capital; prudential reregulation refers to the rule
adjustments that regulators make in the wake of access deregulation to ensure
investor confidence and promote efficient markets. See id.
26. See id.
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competitive pressure, 27 and because competition between exchanges
is now taking place globally, 28 it is clear that regulatory changes in
Europe must be answered by regulatory changes in the United States,
and vice versa. 29 Appropriate reregulation of securities markets is
vital to capital formation because deregulation generally results in
expanded investment opportunities 3° and the conduct of newly
minted markets in those investments must have an appropriate set of
rules to ensure investor confidence. 3 '
The regulatory cycle outlined above has consequences not only for
the structure of the market but also for the diversity of products
traded in those markets.32 The terms of reference of the Committee of
Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets ("Wise
Men") 33 explicitly acknowledged the difficulty that EC internal
market legislation was having in constructing a regulatory regime
that would facilitate innovation in European securities markets.34
27. See Pagano & Steil, supra note 17, at 12 (arguing that continental European
regulators liberalized securities trading rules because of competition from U.K.
automatic quotation trading systems).
28. See generally Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States
And Europe: Automation, Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 497, 500-06 (2001) (discussing the structure of the major stock
exchanges of the United States and Europe and contemplating the possibility of
mergers between those exchanges).
29. See id at 532-39 (noting that the European countries have not historically
implemented self-regulation as the United States has and further arguing that any
transnational system of stock market regulation will have some degree of selfregulation).
30. See Poser, supra note 17, at 32 (arguing that the "Big Bang" increased the
efficiency of London stock markets and, consequently, continental European
issuers flocked to the London markets to list their securities). The "Big Bang"
deregulated the LSE by permitting variable broker commission rates, opening
exchange membership to foreign firms, computerizing the exchange quotation
system, and abolishing the broker/dealer single capacity restriction. See id.at 31.
31. See Warren, supra note 25, at 188-90 (arguing that European regulators in
the 1980s hesitated to adapt regulation to technological applications out of fear of
regulatory arbitrage because the elimination of monetary controls pursuant to EC
Treaty mandates made it easy for investors to move capital to those markets with
the most favorable regulatory environment).
32. See Avgouleas, supra note 3, at 180-86 (noting that E.U. legislators were
having difficulty creating a flexible regime that could harmonize effectively E.U.
Member State securities legislation without becoming too rigid or stifling
innovation in the quickly changing financial markets).
33. See infra Part L.D (discussing the findings of the Lamfalussy Committee).
34. See Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
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Within the United States, competition among regulatory regimes has
fostered an environment where a financial service provider may
choose the regulator most suitable for the product that the provider
would like to offer.35 In Europe, the consolidated regulator is
increasingly more common,3 6 thus diminishing the potential for intraEuropean Securities Markets 30 (Nov. 9, 2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal -market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/initial-report-wisemen-en.pdf
[hereinafter Initial Lamfalussy Report] (requesting the Wise Men to address the
extent to which E.U. legislation is capable of facilitating technical innovation in
securities trading systems); see also Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 20
(noting the tradeoff between ensuring the harmonization of Member State laws
through binding EC Regulations on the one hand, and ensuring the competitiveness
of European exchanges on the other).
35. See Romano, supra note 16, at 392-97 (suggesting that a regulatory
authority will acknowledge the inefficiency of a particular rule only when
regulated entities are able to relocate to other jurisdictions and engage in valuecreating activity that would be prohibited under the regulatory regime of the initial
regulator). Regulatory flexibility has been particularly conducive to product
innovation in the derivatives markets. See id at 394 n.19 (citing Edward Kane,
Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition between the
SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 367, 380 (1984)).
But see Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities
Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 370 (1997) (arguing that regulators have an
incentive to facilitate product innovation because of the tendency of a regulated
entity's new products to continue to be subject to the authority of the original
regulator, regardless of whether the product's characteristics suggest that it should
be under the authority of a regulator with authority over a different financial
services field).
36. Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
have opted for a consolidated regulator to administer financial markets legislation.
See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and
Supervision in Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 50-53 (2003) (discussing the
creation of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority ("BaFin") and the
U.K. Financial Services Authority ("FSA")). Regulators generally adapt their
structure to more effectively supervise the market participants over which they
have authority. See id. The French consolidated financial markets supervisor
Autorit6 des Marchds Financiers ("French AMF") came into existence on August
1, 2003 with the passage of the Loi No. 2003-706 de S6curitd Financibre of August
1, 2003, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], August 2, 2003. Id. at 50 n.3; see also Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine Di
Noia, Financial Market Regulation and Supervision: How Many Peaks For the
Euro Area?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 463, 471-72 (2003) (noting that Ireland also has
commenced plans to create a single financial regulator). Belgium, Luxembourg,
and Finland however, have retained sectoral distinctions among regulators. See id.
at 472-73. The Netherlands has adopted the most uncommon approach, whereby
regulatory authority is divided according to the particular goal of regulation, rather
than sectoral competence. See id (noting that one regulatory authority ensures

2008]

FILLING GAPS IN EUROPEAN UNION SECURITIES LAW

397

jurisdictional choice, or arbitrage, among types of financial services
authorities.3 7 However, inter-jurisdictional regulatory choice is an
important driver of capital market growth in Europe; indeed, this is a
basic premise of Euronext's successful business model.38 But in
terms of product innovation in capital markets, the E.U. faces a more
basic challenge. European securities markets are less well developed
than their U.S. counterparts because of the historical reliance on debt
as opposed to equity financing.39 Thus, while it is crucial that the
E.U. move quickly to integrate European capital markets,4 0 the
market transparency and investor protection goals, while market integrity goals are
left to the central bank).
37. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in
Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495,
495-97 (2003) (describing competition between the SEC, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC"), the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, and the U.S.
Treasury Department for jurisdiction to regulate financial markets and products at
the federal level); see also Jorge E. Vifiuales, The International Regulation of
Financial Conglomerates: A Case-Study of Equivalence as an Approach to
Financial Integration, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 8-9 (2006) (arguing that the
purpose of regulation should be to establish a competitive field for market
participants that are subject to different regulatory regimes). One can identify two
relevant vectors for "arbitrage" among regulators: intra-jurisdictional choice
among banking, securities, derivatives, and insurance regulators; and interjurisdictional choice between equivalent financial markets regulators from
different jurisdictions. See id. See generally Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage
for Real: International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities
Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563, 635-37 (1998) (arguing that national regulatory
systems do compete to attract market participants, but that such regimes also
interact with one another and can function to complement the foreign regulatory
regime, or to undermine that regime). But see Warren, supra note 25, at 189
(criticizing the debate on regulatory arbitrage and arguing that historical precedent
demonstrates that market participants do not migrate to the jurisdiction with the
lowest regulatory costs).
38. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the business model of Euronext and the
manner in which it exploits the mutual recognition principle).
39. See Initial Lamfalussy Report, supra note 34, at 9 (noting that European
corporations have been more heavily dependent on bank loans for financing than
corporations in the U.S. and that as recently as the early 1980s less than twenty
percent of business financing was in the form of equity); see also MOLONEY, supra
note 1, at 22 (examining the 1966 Segre Report findings regarding the
underdevelopment of European capital markets and outlining the initial phases of
EC securities market integration); Warren, supra note 25, at 193-94 (discussing the
potential for increased development of the secondary market for equities in
Europe).
40. See Robert A. Schwartz, Equity Trading II: Integration, Fragmentation,&
the Quality of Markets, in THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: THE STATE OF THE
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legislative approach to integration must remain flexible so as not to
stifle the growth of an already laggard equity market.4 '
B. THE MERGER OF NYSE GROUP & EURONEXT N.V. POSES
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES FOR EC SECURITIES MARKET
HARMONIZATION EFFORTS
Despite the uncertain EC regulatory environment, Euronext N.V.
and other cross-border European securities exchanges have pushed
regulators to converge national securities law. 42 Euronext has done
this by electronically linking multiple E.U. Member State securities
exchanges and cooperating with securities authorities from those
jurisdictions with a view to harmonizing legislation applicable to
securities trading. 43 However, the recently announced merger of
Euronext with the NYSE has thrown into doubt the role of market
participants such as Euronext in advancing the goal of EC securities
law harmonization.4 4

supra note 17, at 61 (explaining
that market fragmentation occurs in two instances: competition among market
architectures and fragmentation from one market "pirating" the price discovery
taking place in another market). The former is healthy for the market while the
latter reduces liquidity in the traded instruments. See id.
41. Compare FinalLamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 7-8 (urging E.U. bodies
to quicken the pace of harmonization measures in the securities field to capture the
significant economic benefits from capital markets integration before market
fragmentation entrenches financial market participants in a non-uniform nationallevel regulatory framework), with Committee of European Securities Regulators,
Ref. No. 04-333f, Preliminary ProgressReport: Which Supervisory Tools For the
EU Securities Markets?, An Analytical Paper by CESR 2 (Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.cesr.eu/index.php?docid=2541 [hereinafter Himalaya Report] (arguing
that the degree of convergence in securities market regulation depends on which
securities market participants one is addressing). The Committee of European
Securities Regulators ("CESR") feels that securities market integration is a long
term process which will require regulators to revamp their supervisory powers to
adapt the EC securities harmonization measures to the markets over which they
have regulatory authority. See id.
42. See Euronext N.V., 2005 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT AND ANNUAL REPORT
18-19 (2006), available at http://www.euronext.com/file/view/0,4245,1626_53424
_824839144,00.pdf [hereinafter EURONEXT ANNUAL REPORT] (stating that
Euronext's harmonization efforts led to the creation of the Euronext College).
43. See id. (lauding the advantages of Euronext's IT infrastructure in
facilitating cross-border trading).
44. See infra Part III.B (arguing that NYSE's influence may lead the newly
formed enterprise to focus its attention on areas of the world beyond Europe).
UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MILLENNIUM,
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1. Market ParticipantsSuch As Euronext Play a CrucialRole in EC
HarmonizationEfforts
Euronext N.V. is an Amsterdam-based holding company formed
in September 2000 that operates stock and derivatives exchanges in
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United
Kingdom.4 5 Euronext's wholly owned subsidiaries operate the
exchanges and the subsidiary market operators must comply
individually with national securities exchange regulation.46 Although
the Euronext business model is built upon the mutual recognition
principle4 7 that is at the core of EC securities harmonization
legislation, Euronext has proceeded beyond the minimum

45. See EURONEXT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 12-13; ARAN & PATEL,
supra note 23, at 141-44 (outlining the structure of Euronext N.V. and giving a
chronology of the consolidation of the Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, and Lisbon
equity exchanges and the London International Financial Futures and Options
Exchange ("LIFFE")); see also Poser, supra note 28, at 504-05 (noting that, as of
2001, the $2.4 trillion market capitalization of Euronext markets made Euronext
the second largest exchange in Europe behind the LSE).
46. See generally EURONEXT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 161-62
(discussing the applicability of national regulations to the operations of Euronext
exchanges in the five distinct Euronext jurisdictions). Because Euronext is a
holding company, it is not directly subject to regulation as an exchange operator.
See id.
47. See Andrea M. Corcoran & Terry L. Hart, The Regulation of Cross-Border
Financial Services in the EU Internal Market, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 221, 236-46
(2002) (explaining the principle of mutual recognition). Recognition by one E.U.
Member State of a regulated entity's compliance with the regulatory requirements
of another E.U. Member State is premised on a prior harmonization of minimum
standards among EC states under agreed EC securities legislation. See id.
Additionally, such mutual recognition requires that the home country of the
regulated entity continue to supervise that entity's compliance with the national
level regulations of the jurisdiction from which it is hailing. See id.; see also
Yannis V. Avgerinos, Problems with Home Country Control and Investment
Services, in FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A SINGLE REGULATOR?,
supra note 3, at 87-93 (criticizing the home country control element of the Single
European Act's harmonization framework on the grounds that the success of the
home country control element is dependent upon the institutional and professional
capabilities of the home country regulator, while EC legislation does not provide
for standards in this area); Avgouleas, supra note 3, at 183 (describing the rationale
for the transition to the more flexible framework of mutual recognition and
minimum harmonization). The 1985 White Paper recommended the adoption of
the mutual recognition, minimum harmonization, and home country control
principles. See id The 1986 Single European Act incorporated these principles into
the Treaty of Rome. See id
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harmonization" aspect of EC securities legislation and sought to
create a unified set of listing and trading rules for Euronext
exchanges.49
Euronext utilizes a business model that exploits the mutual
recognition principle.50 An issuer that wishes to list a security on a
Euronext exchange must comply with the listing requirements of the
jurisdiction from which it hails and thereafter the issuer may access
the aggregate capital pool of Euronext's electronically linked
exchanges.5 To list on a Euronext exchange an issuer must comply
with all the listing standards of Euronext Rulebook I as well as the
rules of Euronext Rulebook II that pertain to the jurisdiction that the
issuer has chosen as its "entry point."52 Rulebook I contains listing
requirements that have been harmonized among all Euronext
jurisdictions, while Rulebook II contains non-harmonized rules. By
increasing the number of harmonized listing rules in Rulebook I,
Euronext thereby decreases the number of distinct listing
requirements in Rulebook II with which an issuer must comply for
listing and admission to trading on all Euronext exchanges.53 Thus,
48. See generally Gerard Hertig, Regulatory Competition for EU Financial
Services,

in

REGULATORY

COMPETITION

AND

ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION:

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 221-22 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds.,
2001) (explaining the relationship between mutual recognition and minimum
harmonization of standards).
49. See Initial Lamfalussy Report, supra note 34, at 15-16 (discussing the
inadequacy of mutual recognition and minimum harmonization as driving
principles for EC securities law harmonization); see also MOLONEY, supra note 1,
at 861-70 (explaining the Lamfalussy Process for adoption of securities law
harmonization measures).
50. See EURONEXT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 15-16 (noting that
Euronext takes advantage of the harmonization of European financial market
regulations in offering access to multiple European markets).
51. See id. (explaining the role of cooperative rule harmonization in Euronext's
business model); see also PROSPECTUS OF NYSE EURONEXT, INC. 349-51
(Euronext, N.V., Nov. 27, 2006), available at http://www.euronext.com
/file/view/0,4245,1626_53424_979643772,00.pdf [hereinafter NYSE EURONEXT
PROSPECTUS] (discussing Euronext's harmonized Rulebook I, which sets listing
requirements for all Euronext jurisdictions, and Rulebook II which contains
additional, distinct listing requirements for each individual jurisdiction).
52. See EURONEXT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 15-16.
53. See id. at 13 (stating that cash-settled instruments on the Amsterdam,
Brussels, Lisbon, and Paris exchanges are traded through a single order book). An
issuer accesses the liquidity pool of all Euronext markets after complying with the
listing requirements of its home jurisdiction. See id at 15-16. An issuer need only
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Euronext provides issuers with the opportunity to access a larger
54
pool of capital at a lower cost.
The mutual recognition principle is premised on prior
harmonization by E.U. Member States of minimum standards
contained in EC legislation.5 While it is clear that Euronext's
business model attracts listings by offering issuers an expanded
market with the aid of the mutual recognition principle, Euronext has
proceeded beyond the goal of minimum harmonization of standards
on which the mutual recognition principle is premised.5 6 Indeed,
Euronext has worked actively with regulators in the five Euronext
jurisdictions to harmonize the listing rules for its exchanges.5 7 The
Euronext Regulatory MOU establishes the framework for such
cooperative rule harmonization. 8 Under the terms of the Euronext
Regulatory MOU, Euronext is obligated to cooperate with the
securities authorities ("Euronext College") 9 of the jurisdictions in
comply with those requirements in Rulebook II that pertain to the market in which
the issuer would like to list and trade its securities. See NYSE EURONEXT
PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at 198. However, traders in Euronext markets are
permitted access to the order book of all Euronext markets with the result that an
investor from a jurisdiction in which the issuer is not listed can nevertheless trade
in that issuer's securities. See id.
54. See EURONEXT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 19.
55. See infra Part I.D (discussing the three-part harmonization framework of
the Single European Act). The minimum harmonization approach has proved
inadequate, however, and legislation adopted pursuant to the Financial Services
Action Plan under the Lamfalussy Process since March 2001 has proceeded
beyond minimum harmonization and created free standing EC level regulatory
regimes in a number of areas. See Avgouleas, supra note 3, at 181 (noting that EC
legislation has established a framework that is relatively independent of national
laws in the areas of market abuse, exchange licensing, and altemative trading
systems).

56. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship
of the mutual recognition principle, harmonization of minimum standards, and
home country control).
57. See Di Giorgio & Di Noia, supra note 36, at 476 (arguing that the mutual
recognition and minimum harmonization approach failed to bring about
convergence of securities regulation).
58. See generally Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12.
59. See id. art. I, paras. 1.1, 1.2 (establishing a Chairmen's Committee and a
Steering Committee to facilitate cooperation under the Euronext Regulatory
MOU). The group of regulatory authorities that are signatory to the MOU is known
as the College of Euronext Regulators, or Euronext College. See NYSE EURONEXT
PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at A-15 (defining the Euronext College as the
Committee of Chairmen of the AMF, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial
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which Euronext operates regulated markets. The Euronext College
has authority under the Euronext Regulatory MOU to approve the
modification and harmonization of Euronext Rulebooks. 60 Euronext
must also consult with the Euronext College to obtain non-opposition
to the issuance of Euronext notices for interpreting or implementing
the provisions of the Rulebooks. 6 ' In general, Euronext's cooperation
with the Euronext College encompasses the harmonization of
domestic regulations pertaining to listing requirements, prospectuses,
on-going obligations of listed companies, take-over bids, and
disclosure of large shareholdings. 62 Clearly, then, the goals of the
Euronext Regulatory MOU are identical to the goal of creating
harmonized securities regulation in the EC.
2. The NYSE Euronext Merger Will Change the Dynamic of EC
Securities Law Harmonization
NYSE Group, Inc. reached an agreement of merger with Euronext
on June 1, 2006.63 Commentators billed the merger as creating the

Markets (Autoriteit Financiele Markten), the Belgian CBFA, the Portuguese
Securities Market Commission (Comiss-ao do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarios or
"CMVM"), and the U.K. Financial Services Authority ("FSA")).
60. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. III, 3.1.1.
61. See id. art. 1II, 3.1.1.
62. See id. art. VII, 7.1.
63. See Press Release, NYSE Group, Inc., NYSE Group and Euronext N.V.
Agree to a Merger of Equals (June 2, 2006), available at http://www.
nyse.com/press/1 149157439121.html; Aaron Lucchetti et al., NYSE, Euronext Set
Plans to Form a Market Giant: Landmark $20 Billion Deal By U.S., Europe
Exchanges Faces Oversight Questions, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2006, at Al (quoting
Joel Seligman, a distinguished expert in securities law and the President of the
University of Rochester, as stating that the combined NYSE Euronext "will be
potentially subject to a new form of international regulation. We may be moving to
a new type of exchange that is extra-territorial, a world stock exchange"). See
generally Poser, supra note 28, at 500-01, 524-28 (describing the structure of the
NYSE). NYSE Group, Inc. operates the NYSE, a traditional, "open outcry"
exchange, and NYSE Arca, an electronic derivatives and equities exchange
acquired by NYSE Group as part of NYSE's merger with Archipelago Holdings,
Inc. See Press Release, NYSE Group, Inc., New York Stock Exchange and
Archipelago Exchange Agree To Merge 2 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/j ointrelease.pdf
(announcing
NYSE-Archipelago
merger and outlining terms of merger transaction); see also Fleckner, supra note
13, at 2558-59 (discussing the NYSE-Archipelago merger in light of the falling
price of NYSE seats, crises in upper-level management at the exchange, and fraud
investigations against the NYSE and specialist firms).
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world's first transatlantic stock exchange.64 Soon after the
announcement of the merger a flurry of speculation arose as to
whether U.S. and European securities exchange regulation might
overlap among the exchanges operated by the merged entity.65
Specifically, because the combination agreement proposes that the
merged NYSE Euronext entity be incorporated in Delaware,6 6
European regulatory authorities have expressed concern at the
possibility that stricter U.S. corporate governance legislation might
be applied to companies listed on Euronext exchanges as a
consequence of the ownership of Euronext exchanges by the U.S.based NYSE Euronext entity. 67 However, U.S. and European

64. See, e.g., Lucchetti et al., supra note 63.
65. See Jeremy Grant, Hurdles Appear in the Racefor Exchange Consolidation
The Planned NYSE-Euronext Deal Raises Doubts About Who Regulates What,
Says Jeremy Grant, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 2006, at 24 (noting "regulatory
uncertainty" regarding the extent to which Sarbanes-Oxley legislation might apply
to companies listed on Euronext exchanges as a consequence of the merger of
NYSE with Euronext); Jeremy Grant, Regulators Face Uncharted Waters if Deal
Goes Ahead NYSE-EURONEXT, FIN. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at 24 [hereinafter
Uncharted Waters] (quoting Anthony Belchambers, CEO of the United Kingdom
Futures and Options Association, as stating that some key terms defining the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities and commodities regulation is under review, thus
contributing to uncertainty over the reach of U.S. corporate governance standards).
66. See NYSE EURONEXT PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at 200 (describing
structure of proposed NYSE Euronext merger transaction and the legal personality
of the merged entity).
67. In the U.K. in late 2006, Economic Secretary to the Treasury Edward Balls
was drafting legislation that would give the U.K. FSA "veto power over a U.S.owned U.K. exchange if it were to produce rules that that did not fit current British
regulatory templates." See Jeremy Grant, Regulators and Companies Fight
Legislative Creep Europe is Seeking Ways of Reducing the Back-Door Impact on
Business of Possible US Legislation, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at 29. In the
Netherlands, Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm had initially threatened to thwart the
merger by withholding Euronext's license to operate the Amsterdam exchange. See
Digby Larner, NYSE-Euronext Deal Clears Hurdle: Dutch Minister Withdraws
Veto Threat as Concerns Over Regulations Are Eased,WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2006,
at C3. In France, the Chairman of the AMF, Michel Prada, noted the concern of
French regulatory authorities over the governance structure of the newly minted
NYSE Euronext entity, with particular regard to regulatory review of board
appointments at the new entity to ensure that senior management did not engage in
excessive risk taking. See Norma Cohen, 'Veto' Hurdle For Euronext Deal:
Regulators Want Say in Board Appointments: Concerns Remain Over Merger of
Exchanges, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at 13. Indeed, the former President of
France, Jacques Chirac, went so far as to call on Euronext to form a "FrancoGerman Alliance" rather than agree on a merger with an American exchange. See
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securities and commodities authorities that regulate NYSE Group
and Euronext equities and derivatives exchanges have repeatedly
stated that mere joint ownership of such exchanges by entities hailing
from different jurisdictions will not cause the regulatory standards of
one jurisdiction to be applicable to exchange operations or
68
companies listed on exchanges in another jurisdiction.
But NYSE Group and Euronext shareholders have not been
discouraged by the uncertainty of the regulatory regime that
ultimately will govern a combined NYSE Euronext. 69 Euronext
shareholders approved the merger on December 19, 2006, 70 and
NYSE Group Shareholders approved the merger on December 20,
2006. 7 Commentators have suggested that NYSE Group's incentive
Alistair MacDonald & Edward Taylor, Chirac Frowns on NYSE-Euronext:
Deutsche Boerse Takes Heart From French Leader's Call For Franco-German
Alliance, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2006, at C4.
68. See Press Release, Autoritd des marches financiers, SEC Chairman,
Euronext Regulators Meet to Discuss Cooperation in the Event of the NYSE
Euronext Combination (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://www.amffrance.org/documents/general7342_1 .pdf (reaffirming regulators' initial assertions
that Euronext exchanges would not be subject to SEC regulation merely because of
their ownership by a U.S.-based holding company); Letter from the Chairman's
Committee of the Euronext Regulators to Jean-Frangois Thdodore, Chairman and
CEO of Euronext N.V. (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.amffrance.org/documents/generaU/7509_1.pdf [hereinafter Euronext Letter] (stating
that the Euronext College does not believe that the current structure of the
combined NYSE Euronext entity would give rise to regulatory "spillover" from the
United States to Euronext exchanges, but that such an assessment was strictly
confined to the structure of the combined entity as represented to the College in the
preparatory documents, and in the light of public and private statements by the
SEC to the effect that such regulatory "spillover" would not occur); see also
Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks Before the UCLA Law Third
Annual Institute on Corporate Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions (Oct. 23,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch102306aln.htm
(noting that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would not require registration of
the Euronext exchanges with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission and that
Euronext exchanges did not intend to offer their products directly in the United
States).
69. See Press Release, Euronext N.V., Euronext Shareholders Approve
Combination with NYSE Group 1 (Dec. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.euronext.com/file/view/0,4245,1626_53424_997980078,00.pdf (noting
that over 98% of Euronext shareholders approved of the merger).
70. See id
71. See Press Release, NYSE Group, Inc., NYSE Group Shareholders
Overwhelmingly Approve Combination with Euronext, Preliminary Results
Indicate 1 (Dec. 20, 2006) available at http://www.nyse.com/press/l166613
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to pursue the combination with Euronext arises from a desire to
circumvent stricter U.S. corporate governance legislation,72 to realize
economies of scale from consolidation of trading activities onto
standard trading platforms across the merged entity,73 and to expand
the NYSE's operations in bond and derivatives markets.74
Irrespective of the rationale for the combination, however, U.S. and
European regulatory agencies clearly will face significant challenges
in creating arrangements to supervise NYSE Euronext and to
negotiate shared regulatory authority over the combined entity's
operations once NYSE Euronext has matured as a combined
organization and has pursued further combinations with exchanges in
other markets.75

560168.html (reporting that, of the NYSE Group shareholders that participated in
the vote, 99.7% voted in favor of the merger with Euronext and estimating that the
deal should officially close in the first part of 2007).
72. See Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE, via Euronext, Aims to Regain Its Appeal for
InternationalListings, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at C1 (reporting that NYSE
Group's Chief Executive hopes the merger will allow companies to participate in
foreign exchanges that employ "less intrusive" regulations); see also James J.
Cramer, Behind the Euronext Deal, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A10 (noting
that many private equity firms choose to list on Euronext rather than the NYSE due
to Euronext's less strict regulations, which allow for more flexible financing and
greater opportunities for capital formation).
73. See Uncharted Waters, supra note 65, at 24 (suggesting that subsequent to
the merger Euronext and NYSE will seek to integrate technology across exchanges
with a view to generating significant cost savings in the combined entity).
74. See Aaron Lucchetti, Big Board Sees a Bond Bonanza: With Euronext's
System, NYSE Aims to Rebuild Its Trading Book; First, Thain Must Sell the
Merger, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2006, at Cl; Alistair MacDonald et al., NYSE to
Unveil Proposed Tie- Up With Euronext as Rival Scrambles, WALL ST. J., May 22,
2006, at A .
75. See Gaston F. Ceron, NYSE Group's Shareholders Approve Takeover of
Euronext: Support Is Overwhelming For Trans-Atlantic Deal: More Consolidation
Seen, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at C3 (noting that the combined NYSE Euronext
is most likely to seek further expansion in Italy and Asia); Campos, supra note 21
(speculating about the regulatory implications of a transatlantic exchange merger
and opining that regulatory approval of such a merger would only be necessary in
the event that changes to trading rules accompany the merger).
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But ancillary to the issues of regulatory and legislative "creep ' 7 6
from the United States to Europe is the question of the future of
efforts to harmonize the securities regulation of E.U. Member States
pursuant to the Financial Services Action Plan77 ("FSAP"). 8
Harmonization of E.U. Member State securities regulation is
ancillary to this issue of regulatory creep because the harmonization
of E.U. Member State securities regulation created the regulatory
conditions that were necessary for Euronext to become a successful
pan-European exchange and thus an attractive partner for
combination with NYSE Group.7 9 Consequently, before one may

76. See William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC
Derivatives: The Need for a ComparativeInstitution Approach, 21 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 111, 122-23 (1995) (defining regulatory "creep" as "the expansion of regulation
into areas where, from an efficiency perspective, it is not needed" and arguing that
regulators have incentives to impose their regulatory regime on all actors in a given
field, regardless of whether such regulation is necessary to cure market failures in
the regulated field); see also The US-EU Regulatory Dialogue: The Private Sector
Perspective: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and International
Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology of the H. Comm. on FinancialServices,
108th Cong. 10 (2004) (testimony of Richard E. Thornburgh, Chairman, Securities
Industry Association) (encouraging mutual prior consultation between the U.S.
Congress and the European Parliament regarding legislation, such as SarbanesOxley corporate governance standards, that has potential extraterritorial effects
with a view to preventing conflicts between the legislative goals of Europe and the
United States).
77. See Commission Financial Services Action Plan: Implementing the
Framework for Financial Markets COM (1999) 232 final (May 11, 1999),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/finances/actionplan/index_en.htm
#documents.
78. See Jonathan R. Macey, US and EU Structures of Governance as Barriers
to Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 360 (George A.
Bermann et al. eds., 2000) (pointing out the fallacy of premising U.S.-E.U.
regulatory dialogues on bilateral cooperation, when in fact E.U. regulatory policy
and legislation is enforced and executed by E.U. Member State agencies and that
divergences among those agencies are unavoidable); see also Robert A. Prentice,
Regulatory Competition in Securities Law: A Dream (That Should Be) Deferred,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1223-24 (2005) (noting that European securities regulators
are reaching consensus that U.S.-style corporate governance standards contribute
to capital formation and suggesting that European regulators are converging on
corporate governance regulation that is broadly similar to that found in the United
States).
79. See The US-EU Regulatory Dialogue and Its Future: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on FinancialServices, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Michael G.
Oxley, Chairman, Comm. on Financial Services) ("[C]onvergence and equivalence
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evaluate the future relationship between U.S. and European or E.U.level securities regulation one must understand the terms on which
E.U. Member States have undertaken to integrate their national
frameworks for securities regulation.
C. MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING ARE THE PRIMARY MEANS
FOR FACILITATING COOPERATION AMONG SECURITIES
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

Cooperation
between national
securities
regulators has
traditionally taken place via memoranda of understanding
("MOUs").8 ° The U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC")
has led the way in establishing such regulatory arrangements. 8' These
arrangements are generally considered non-binding statements of
intent and create no obligations on the part of the regulators that are
party to the arrangements.82 Although European securities regulators
also have utilized MOUs extensively,8 3 a prime example being the
Euronext Regulatory MOU, cooperation between E.U. Member State
regulatory authorities takes place in the larger context of EC
common market legislation. Thus, the purpose and effect of MOUs
in regulatory structures can only make sense where convergence is already
underway in the markets and where differences in regulation can have a
detrimental impact.").
80. See SEC, International Cooperation in Securities Law Enforcement 3
(2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia enforce/intercoop.
pdf [hereinafter International Cooperation] (noting the necessity of international
cooperation and information sharing among securities regulators and recognizing
MOUs as a common mechanism to facilitate these ends); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the
Future of InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2002) (citing MOUs as the
mechanism of choice due to their "loose and adaptable framework").
81. See International Cooperation, supra note 80, at 3 (pointing out that there
have been over 30 MOUs between the SEC and foreign securities regulators and
recognizing the SEC as among the first regulators to become a party to the
Multilateral MOU of 2002); Raustiala, supra note 80, at 23 (noting that the MOU
between the SEC and the Chilean authority for securities regulation dates back to
1993).
82. See Raustiala, supra note 80, at 22-23; International Cooperation, supra
note 80, at 3 (characterizing MOUs as vehicles for information sharing).
83. See Michael Foot, Managing Director, U.K. FSA, Speech at the Guernsey
Financial Service Commission Seminar on International Cooperation and
Exchange of Information (June 5, 2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.
uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2003/sp134.shtml
(stating that the
FSA has approximately 150 MOUs with various regulatory authorities).
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among E.U. Member State securities authorities must be considered
in light of EC legislation.84
D. ARRANGEMENTS FOR REGULATORY COOPERATION BETWEEN
E.U. MEMBER STATES MUST BE ANALYZED IN LIGHT OF THE EC
FRAMEWORK FOR HARMONIZATION OF SECURITIES LEGISLATION

Prior to the adoption of the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive ("MiFID"),85 there was no comprehensive EC scheme for
regulation of securities trading markets.8 6 EC regulation of securities
trading markets was largely limited to the Investment Services
Directive ("ISD").8 7 Indeed, rules traditionally associated with the
regulation of trading markets were scattered among individual
directives that addressed public offers, issuer disclosure, the

provision of investment services, and market integrity controls.88
This can be partly attributed to the fact that EC legislative
instruments must state the specific EC Treaty authority that causes

84. See TAKIs TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 17-19 (2d ed.
2006) (discussing the manner in which the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") fills
"gaps" in Community law by reference to general principles of E.U. law). The ECJ
has held that national courts must interpret national law in light of applicable E.U.
legislation. See, e.g., Case C-106/89, Marleasing v. Comercial Internacional de
Alimentacion, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135 (explaining that Member State authorities,
including the courts, have an obligation to undertake measures that advance their
commitment to abide by E.U. legislation); see also MENGOZZI, supra note 4, at
129-30 (discussing the Marleasing decision and the primacy of Community law
over national law).
85. Markets in Fin. Instruments Directive, supra note 18. The MiFID repealed
the ISD. Id. at recital 2.
86. See id. at recital 5 (declaring the need for a comprehensive EC trading
markets regime to apply to all types of trading facilities); see also MOLONEY,
supra note 1, at 648 ("Harmonization of the substantive operational regulation of
[European] markets, in the interests of investor protection and the integrity of the
price-formation process, has largely been sidelined."). Moloney attributed the lack
of a consensus on EC trading market regulation pre-MiFID to the fact that trading
markets are not in possession of the internal market "access passport" to which
investment firms are generally entitled. Id at 648, 658. Harmonization through
reregulation, argues Moloney, would occur if exchanges were in possession of
such access passports. Id.
87. See Council Directive 93/22, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27 (EEC) [hereinafter
Investment Services Directive].
88. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 647 (pointing out that the securities trading
market regime includes directives concerning market integrity and market abuse).
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the instrument to be binding on Member States.89 This Treaty
authority is known as the legal basis. 90 The legal basis of the
Community legislative instrument defines the scope of the
legislation, including the method of Community decisionmaking and
whether the instrument is directly applicable or calls for the
harmonization of Member State law. 9' The Community
decisionmaker 92 has relied on a number of different legal bases for
adopting directives in the area of securities regulation.93 This is a
consequence of the fact that securities regulation, in general,
involves rules affecting the conduct of disparate actors, instruments,
and institutions.94 Authority for regulating conduct thus has fallen

89. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 253 (requiring that legislative acts state
their legal basis); see also SENDEN, supra note 4, at 69 ("[Article 249] provides a
catalogue of Community instruments, but not for a general competence to adopt
them."). Senden distinguishes between specific and general legal basis provisions.
Legislation directed at the establishment of the common market, of which the
securities market is a part, derives from general legal basis provisions. See id. at
70-71.
90. See SENDEN, supra note 4, at 70.
91. See id. at 72.
92. See Fernanda Nicola & Fabio Marchetti, Recent Developments:
ConstitutionalizingTobacco: The Ambivalence of European Federalism,46 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 507, 507 n.3 (2005) (denoting "Community decisionmaker" as a term of
art in European Union law). The institution or group of institutions that has
authority to act under the EC Treaty depends on which legal basis the
decisionmaker cites as validating the legislative instrument that the decisionmaker
is adopting. See generally CARL FREDERIK BERGSTROM, COMITOLOGY:
DELEGATION OF POWERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

1-10 (2005) (discussing the division of responsibility among the European
Commission, Council and Parliament in the adoption of legislation).
93. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that EC securities legislation has
relied on the free movement competences set forth in Articles 44(2)(g), 47(2) and
55 of the EC Treaty and the general single market competences set forth in Articles
94 and 95 of the EC Treaty). The choice of legal basis has significant implications
for the legislative procedure that the Community decisionmaker must employ to
adopt legislation. See SENDEN, supra note 4, at 75-76 (discussing the division of
power among the Council, Commission and Parliament). The method of adopting
legislation has, in turn, a significant effect on the content of such legislation
because of the divergent constituencies of the Council, Commission, and
Parliament. See id; see also Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 33-35
(discussing the need to apprise the Parliament of the status of proposed legislation
under the co-decision procedure advocated by the Wise Men).
94. See generally Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION (Aspen Law & Business, 4th ed. 2001) (taking a

comprehensive look at the framework of securities regulation and outlining its
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under different EC Treaty legal bases, with the resulting atomization
of the EC securities regulatory regime into many distinct pieces of
legislation.95
There were two general reasons for the absence of a
comprehensive framework for exchange regulation prior to the
enactment of the MiFID. First, Member States hesitated to subject
their exchanges to EC-wide competition-partly because of the
difficulty of creating a common regulatory framework that could
embrace divergent exchange models throughout Member States.96
Second, Member States were at times ambivalent regarding the
extent of the EC Treaty mandate for creating a common market
because the EC Treaty does not confer on EC institutions the general
authority to regulate the common market. 97 The compromise of the
Single European Act ("SEA") 98 responded to this ambivalence by
laying the groundwork for a three-part common market
harmonization program: harmonization of minimum standards
accompanied by mutual recognition of national laws that conform to
such standards and continuous home country supervision of a

impact on participants such as brokers, dealers and investment advisors, and its
dictates for market behavior).
95. Compare Markets in Fin. Instruments Directive, supra note 18, art. 2
(citing Article 47(2) of the EC Treaty as its legal basis), with Council Directive
2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC) (citing Article 95 of the EC Treaty as its legal
basis). An important concern in the choice of legal basis is the fact that EC Treaty
legal bases cannot alone support a general Community power to regulate the
securities market. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the European
Court of Justice's recent tendency to diligently review the legal basis cited for
community action and its reluctance to accept the single market competences as
sufficient authority for action).
96. See Benn Steil, Equity Trading IV. The ISD and the Regulation of
European Market Structure, in THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: THE STATE OF
THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 17, at 124-25
(describing the debate between France and Italy on the one hand, and the U.K.,
Germany, and the Netherlands on the other, in which the Member States negotiate
for concessions that favor their own domestic exchange models).
97. See Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. I8419, 83 (finding that the Community's powers "are limited to those specifically
conferred on it"); see also MENGOZZI, supra note 4, at 71-72 (stating that Article
249 of the EC Treaty does not bestow on the Community general powers; rather,
Article 3 of the EC Treaty mandates that the Community only take action in
accordance with powers specifically assigned to it by the Treaty).
98. See Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169).
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regulated entity's compliance with home country standards. 99 The
framework of the SEA represented a compromise between those who
would have granted the EC the authority to legislate towards the
creation of a unified market, and the more conservative approach that
would pursue mere "convergence" of national legislation. 0 0
Article 249 of the EC Treaty confers on the EC the power to issue
directives, regulations, and decisions' 0' to achieve Treaty
objectives. 10 2 Regulations are directly applicable in national
legislation and thus supersede conflicting national law. 03 The

99. See generally Lastra, supra note 36, at 61 (tracing the origins of the SEA's
three-part harmonization framework to the 1985 White Paper).The SEA defined in
more concrete terms the extent of market unification envisaged by the Treaty,
thereby resuscitating what critics considered a faltering drive to complete the
internal market. See Claus-Dieter'Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following The
Single European Act, 24 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 361, 363-72, 381-86 (1987)
(discussing the relationship between the SEA's Articles 8(a) and 100(a) and the
origin of those provisions in the 1985 White Paper). The SEA amendments also
had widespread consequences for political and monetary developments of the EC
institutions. See Kenneth A. Armstrong, Governance and the Single European
Market, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 750-51 (Paul Craig & Griinne de Birca
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (suggesting that the Single European Market
initiative created an impact at the micro, meso, and macro levels). A former Judge
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities has criticized the SEA's
redefinition of EC Treaty common market goals. See Pierre Pescatore, Some
CriticalRemarks on the "Single EuropeanAct, " 24 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 9,
11-12 (1987) (suggesting that setting deadlines for the completion of the "internal
market" envisaged by the Single European Act, as opposed to the broader
"common market" concept contemplated in the original EEC Treaty, limits the
capacity of the amended EC Treaty to achieve pervasive harmonization of
markets).
100. Compare Pescatore, supra note 99, at 11-12 (criticizing the SEA and
arguing that the European Court of Justice's interpretation of the common market
goals of the EC Treaty and the combined acts of Community institutions provides
sufficient legal basis for the EC to unify Community markets), with Ehlermann,
supra note 99, at 361-64 (lauding the SEA for defining "common market" to be
"an area without internal frontiers").
101. EC securities legislation has employed the decision instrument of Article
249 EC Treaty sparsely because of the limited applicability of that instrument. See
MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 19. Decisions are binding on those to whom they are
addressed. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 249.
102. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 249.
103. Id. art. 249; see SENDEN, supra note 4, at 47 (stating that Community
regulations need not be transposed directly into Member States' laws because
regulations supersede conflicting national laws). Regulations may, however,
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principles of proportionality and subsidiarity10 4 had counseled against
the use of the regulation because that legislative instrument is less
respectful of the sovereignty of Member States than the directive.105
The directive is the most common binding legislative instrument in
the EC securities regulation regime.1"6 The directive binds Member
States as to the result to be achieved.10 7 Thus, Member States must
modify their national laws so as to achieve the objectives of the
directive. 08 This has resulted in a significant problem of inconsistent
national level implementation of the terms of directives among
Member States. 09

contain terms that the Member State is required to implement into national law.
See id.
104. See SENDEN, supra note 4, at 79-81 (discussing the origin of the principle
of subsidiarity that is contained in Article 5 of the EC Treaty). The subsidiarity
principle stands for the proposition that the E.U. may adopt legislation only if one
of the treaties comprising the E.U. has conferred a power to act. See id. at 81.
While the principle of subsidiarity determines at the threshold whether the EC may
enact legislation that is binding on Member States, the principle of proportionality
elucidates the secondary issue of the permissible scope of EC legislation. See
TRIDIMAS, supra note 84, at 176. While the principle of subsidiarity is operative
only where the EC shares a competence with Member States, the principle of
proportionality is operative in instances of shared competences and where the EC
has an exclusive competence as well. See id
105. See FinalLamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 14 (attributing the sparse use
of regulations in the EC securities regime as a result of "subsidiarity pressure"
from Member States); see also MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 17 (characterizing the
directive as having a "split competence structure" and suggesting that this
alleviates Member State sovereignty concerns).
106. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 17.
107. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 249. See generally SACHA PRECHAL,
DIRECTIVES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: A STUDY OF DIRECTIVES AND THEIR
ENFORCEMENT IN NATIONAL COURTS 44-58 (1995) (discussing the general nature
of Member States' obligation to achieve the results that a directive dictates).
108. See SENDEN, supra note 4, at 49. The directive not only obliges Member
States to achieve the objectives of the directive, but requires that Member States
apply and enforce national law so as to achieve the objectives of the directive as
well. See id
109. See Initial Lamfalussy Report, supra note 34, at 33 (stating that 75% of
respondents consulted by the Wise Men during the evaluation of the EC securities
legislation framework considered that Member States neither transposed nor
implemented directives consistently); see also MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 17-19
(attributing the problem of inconsistent implementation to the fact that, at times,
legislative provisions are vague and lack clear definitions). Moloney also cites the
absence of guiding principles as a cause of divergent implementation of directives
that are insufficiently clear as to their objective. See id. at 18.
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Indeed, the Wise Men identified the problem of inconsistent
implementation as a major impediment to the completion of the
common EC securities market." ° Thus, the Wise Men called on the
Community decisionmaker to make greater use of the regulation for
securities legislation"' and to supplement the SEA harmonization
program with a four level hierarchy of legislation that is intended to
minimize the problem of inconsistent national level implementation
of EC securities directives." 2 The Wise Men also called for the
establishment of the Committee of European Securities Regulators
("CESR").' ' CESR now serves two distinct functions in the EC
securities regime."' As an advisory body under Level 2 of the
Lamfalussy Process, CESR consults with the Commission during the
drafting of securities legislation.' Under Level 3 of the Lamfalussy
Process, CESR serves as a forum for collaboration among securities
authorities to ensure consistent implementation of EC securities
legislation.'

16

110. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 13-15 (stating that the
national level implementation problem is a result of both ambiguity in the
directives themselves, as well as the lack of coordination among national securities
regulators charged with administering national regulations).
111. See id. at 26 (proposing the use of regulations over directives).
112. See generally Avgouleas, supra note 3, at 185-88 (discussing the
Lamfalussy Process' four-level regulatory approach). "Level 1" legislation largely
is to consist of directives that outline general principles, while "Level 2" directives
and regulations are to elucidate technical details of regulation that are necessary to
avoid inconsistent implementation by Member States. See id. "Level 2" legislation
is to employ the comitology procedure, thus excluding the active involvement of
the Parliament and increasing the efficiency of the legislative process. See id.
"Level 3" is directed towards cooperation among national regulators and
consistency in administration of the law, while "Level 4" of the Lamfalussy
Process seeks to ensure consistency in enforcement. See id.
113. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 31. The Wise Men had
designated the body the Committee of European Securities Regulators prior to its
creation. See id.
114. See Lastra, supra note 36, at 63 n.48 (stating that CESR was established on
June 6, 2001 as an advisory committee to the European Commission). CESR grew
out of the cooperative forum that previously existed under the auspices of the
Federation of European Securities Commissions ("FESCO"). See id.
115. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 31 (noting that CESR, also
known as "ESRC," serves as an "independent advisory committee" during Level 2
of the Lamfalussy Process).
116. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 31.

AM. U. INT'L L. REv.

[23:387

II. ANALYSIS
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that market forces have
begun to drive harmonization of E.U. Member State securities
regulation independently of EC legislative efforts towards this end.
The success of the pan-European stock exchange Euronext and its
recently announced merger with the NYSE demonstrate the power of
market-driven harmonization." 7 The market-driven harmonization of
securities rules governing the operation of Euronext markets occurs
under the consultative framework of the Euronext Regulatory
MOU. I8 However, the relationship of the Euronext Regulatory MOU
to EC securities legislation is not clear. 1 9 It is important, then, to
understand how the Euronext Regulatory MOU interacts with EC
securities legislation so that these instruments do not work at crosspurposes. 2 0
A. THE EURONEXT REGULATORY MOU Is TAILORED TO THE
GOAL OF INTEGRATING EC SECURITIES TRADING MARKETS

I argue that the regulatory authorities of Belgium, France, and the
Netherlands originally created the Euronext College to address the
challenges of exchange consolidation in light of the absence of a
well-defined mandate to harmonize Member State trading market
rules. Although EC internal market legislation provided regulators
with general harmonization imperatives, there was no EC directive or
regulation directly applicable to harmonization of trading market

117. See NYSE Group and Euronext Announce Merger: U.S.-European Deal to
Create Global Exchange, 13 NYSE GROUP NEWSLETTER (NYSE Group, Inc., New
York, N.Y.), June 2006, available at http://www.nyse.com/about/publication
/1145959806931 .html (announcing and detailing the merger of the NYSE Group
with Euronext). Cf Cally Jordan & Giovanni Majnoni, Regulatory Harmonization
and the Globalization of Finance, in GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS 265-68 (James A. Hanson et al. eds., 2003) (arguing that market
participants play a crucial and often overlooked role in inducing convergence of

regulatory standards).
118. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. I (explaining that the
goal of cooperative supervision is to enhance the efficiency of the overall

regulatory framework).
119. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the differing viewpoints concerning the
need for and goals of the Euronext Regulatory MOU).
120. Cf infra Part II.A (analyzing the Euronext Regulatory MOU in the context
of the EC).
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rules at the time Euronext was created.12' The harmonization
framework established in the Euronext Regulatory MOU is effective
because technological advances are driving the global consolidation
of the financial services industry and are thus constantly changing
the structure of the industry and the regulatory dynamic. 22 Because
the Euronext Regulatory MOU provides for close cooperation
between industry and the regulators in developing new rules for
securities exchange regulation, the rules thus negotiated are better
informed of the emerging structure of the industry. Moreover, the
Euronext Regulatory MOU has the additional benefit of harmonizing
securities exchange regulation without the negative effects of "race
to the bottom," since multiple regulators of varying levels of
expertise and regulatory approaches are involved in the
harmonization process. 123
Generally, one can identify three degrees of regulatory
convergence. 124 First, non-binding MOUs facilitate cooperation25
between regulatory authorities in the enforcement of their statutes.

121. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing the ISD and the
lack of a coherent framework for EC regulation of trading markets).
122. See Raustiala, supra note 80, at 22 (noting that MOUs help generate "loose
and adaptable frameworks"); supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the
cycle of deregulation, technological adaptation, increased competition, and
reregulation).
123. See Manning Gilbert Warren, Regulatory Harmony in the European
Communities: The Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 19, 50-51
(1990) (suggesting that the mutual recognition principle requires E.U. Member
States with higher standards to accept the lower regulatory standards of other
jurisdictions, thus placing pressure on the state with the higher standard to level the
playing field for its nationals by withdrawing its higher standard of regulation).
124. See Examining the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Developments
Concerning InternationalConvergence: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 11-12 (2004) (statement of Andrew
Sheng, Chairman, Securities & Futures Commission of Hong Kong)
(distinguishing between harmonization of applicable laws and convergence
between regulatory goals and principles). Cf Shaffer, supra note 19, at 32-33
(comparing three methods for lowering regulatory barriers to trade: harmonization
of rules, mutual recognition of foreign standards, and national treatment).
125. See Raustiala, supra note 80, at 22-23 (comparing MOUs to mutual legal
assistance treaties ("MLATs") and arguing that regulators prefer MOUs as a
vehicle for information sharing because action under an MOU does not trigger the
procedural complexities and involvement of judicial authorities as is the case under
an MLAT). Authorities tend to employ the MLAT when a jurisdiction has more
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Second, one can see an increasing degree of convergence in "positive
comity" accords 12 6 and agreements regarding mutual recognition of
foreign regulatory standards.1 27 Third, the greatest degree of

stringent secrecy laws and when the regulator is seeking information for use in
criminal rather than civil proceedings. See id. at 31-38.
126. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws.: From Sovereignty to
Substance, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 951 (2002) (describing positive comity
initiatives as an expansion of the principle of mutual assistance inherent in MOU
and MLAT arrangements and noting that contemporary trends in bilateral
competition enforcement agreements exhibit characteristics of "shared
sovereignty"). Positive comity agreements enable the regulatory authority of one
jurisdiction to enforce the standards of a foreign jurisdiction when the foreign
jurisdiction so requests. See id. at 951 n.109. Regulators tend to view such
arrangements favorably because they limit the potential for conflict arising from
extraterritorial application of law. See OECD Committee on Competition Law &
Policy, CLP Report on Positive Comity 59 (OECD Doc. DAFFE/CLP(99)19)
(June 1999), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/3/2752161.pdf (stating the
EC's position that recourse to positive comity accords has the desirable effect of
limiting U.S. extraterritorial application of competition law). See generally Merit
E. Janow, TransatlanticRegulatory Cooperation in Competition Policy: The Case
for 'Soft Harmonization' and Multilateralism Over New US EU Institutions, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL

PROSPECTS, supra note 78, at 253-61 (discussing the 1998 U.S.-E.U. Positive
Comity Accord). The 1998 Positive Comity Accord delineates the terms on which
the competition authorities of one nation may refer suspected anticompetitive
conduct that is occurring within the jurisdiction of one country and harming the
interests of the referring nation. See id. at 254; see also Agreement on the
Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their
Competition Laws, June 4, 1998, U.S.-EC, 37 I.L.M. 1070 (1998) [hereinafter
1998 Positive Comity Accord].
127. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the InternationalReach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
903, 918-21 (1998) (terming mutual recognition agreements to be "normal
reciprocity" agreements and citing the example of the U.S.-Can.
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System ("MJDS")); Hertig, supra note 48, at 221
(describing mutual recognition as both a "negative integration" and a "positive
integration" approach to harmonization). The mutual recognition principle was
also a core element of EC securities harmonization prior to the adoption of the
Lamfalussy Process, which mandated more comprehensive legislation. See
Warren, supra note 25, at 198 (stating that the SEA represented a tactical change in
the sense that, after the SEA, EC legislation no longer sought to create uniform
rules, but rather required Member States to implement minimum regulatory
standards and to recognize the adequacy of compliance with such standards
throughout the EC); supra note 112 (detailing the Lamfalussy Process). But cf
MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 197 (discussing the failure of the EC mutual
recognition approach); Felicia H. Kung, The Rationalization of Regulatory
Internationalization,33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 443, 462-64 (2002) (criticizing
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convergence arises in the EC mandate to actively harmonize the
securities legislation of Member States. 28 The Euronext Regulatory
MOU does not fall squarely into any of these three categories,2 9 but
rather must be understood as a unique arrangement to facilitate the
achievement of the harmonization mandates of EC securities
legislation in light of gaps in that legislation. 3 ° The Euronext
Regulatory MOU does not resemble the MOUs to which the SEC is a
party because the signatories to the Euronext Regulatory MOU treat
the arrangement as creating positive legal obligations. Finally, the
Euronext Regulatory MOU itself is modeled on the EC
harmonization framework that existed prior to the advent of the
Lamfalussy Process.
1. U.S. SEC MOUs Do Not Seek Convergence in Regulatory
StandardsAmong Jurisdictions
It is important to recognize at the outset that the fact that a
cooperative arrangement between regulatory authorities is not
labeled an MOU does not necessarily mean that the instrument
shares the characteristics normally associated with MOUs.' 3 ' In the
context of cooperation in securities law enforcement,' 3 2 MOUs that

mutual recognition under MJDS because it does not treat all issuers equally,
encourages regulatory arbitrage, and stifles innovation in regulatory standards).
128. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing EC Treaty mandate
to create a single internal market).
129. Cf Raustiala, supra note 80, at 37-38 n.173 (noting that the DOJ has a
number of less formal international arrangements that do not rise to the level of a
binding international treaty, such as an MLAT). Raustiala argues that these
instruments resemble MOUs, but that the DOJ nevertheless treats them as binding
sole executive agreements. See id
130. Cf Wymeersch Working Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing
"contractually organi[z]ed supervision" of financial services providers).
131. See Raustiala, supra note 80, at 37-38 (noting that DOJ employs a number
of informal international arrangements that resemble MOUs while not being
labeled MOUs).
132. See id. at 30-32 (stating that SEC MOUs provide avenues for the sharing of
information, policy initiatives, and enforcement resources between regulators).
SEC MOUs are generally of three types: enforcement MOUs, regulatory MOUs,
and technical assistance MOUs. Technical assistance MOUs focus on providing
assistance to foreign regulators, primarily from jurisdictions with underdeveloped
markets, in developing a regulatory policy and in training personnel in the effective
enforcement of regulatory policy. See id. at 32-35 (arguing that the provision of
technical assistance to developing markets has the desirable side-effect of
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the SEC has concluded generally state that they create no legal
obligations on the part of the signatory authorities and merely33
express the intent of the signatories as to a future course of action.1
Enforcement MOUs generally delineate the terms on which the
authorities intend to share information needed to investigate or
litigate potential violations of the securities laws. 34 These MOUs are
influencing regulatory policy choices in developing markets and "exports" SECstyle regulation and enforcement); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and
Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 293-97 (2004)
(arguing that the SEC's annual international enforcement and market development
training institutes provide a visible forum for "export" of U.S. securities regulatory
standards); Frank S. Shyn, Internationalization of the Commodities Market:
Convergence of Regulatory Activity, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 597, 640-42
(1994) (discussing the CFTC's enforcement and regulatory MOUs). The SEC's
regulatory MOUs do not provide for convergence in regulatory policy, as does the
Euronext Regulatory MOU, but rather they are arrangements for prudential
supervision of particular financial services firms. Cf Raustiala, supra note 80, at
29-30 (stating that the SEC has entered over "30 MOUs with foreign authorities,"
each detailing required cooperative efforts).
133. See Raustiala, supra note 80, at 23 (stating that MOUs have a "quasi-legal
authority"). See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation
15(a), U.S.-Sing., May 16,
and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information
2000, availableat http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oiabilateral/singapore.pdf
[hereinafter SEC-Sing. Enforcement MOU] (declaring that the MOU is not legally
binding and does not supersede domestic law). MOUs sponsored by international
organizations such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO") also operate in terms on a non-binding basis. See OICU-IOSCO
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, Members of the International
Organization of Securities Commission, 6(a), May 2002 (declaring that the MOU
is not legally binding and does not supersede domestic law); see also David
Zaring, Informal Procedure,Hard and Soft, in InternationalAdministration, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 547, 561-69 (2005) (discussing the role of IOSCO in facilitating
cooperation among securities regulators).
134. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-550, title II, 104 Stat. 2714 (1990) (granting the Commission the authority
to release records for multiple purposes including for enforcement of rules and
regulations). See generally Pamela Jimenez, InternationalSecurities Enforcement
CooperationAct and Memorandaof Understanding,31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 295, 29597 (1990) (explaining how the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation
Act, S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), gave the SEC authority to enter into
the information sharing arrangements that form the foundation of MOUs). The
SEC's MOUs also contain provisions that limit the permissible use of information
obtained under the MOU. See, e.g., SEC-Sing. Enforcement MOU, supra note 133,
19(a)(ii) (stating that a requesting authority may use information for a purpose
beyond the specific need identified in an initial request for assistance, but within
the general framework of such request, only where the information is sought to be
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generally confined to information sharing efforts and do not
contemplate actual enforcement of domestic law for the benefit of
the foreign jurisdiction.'35 Indeed, the information sharing
arrangements of SEC enforcement MOUs do not implicate
traditional international comity' 3 6 considerations either, since the
invocation by a foreign regulator of its investigatory and subpoena
powers at the behest of the SEC generally does not involve conflicts
among foreign and domestic law.' 37
The SEC also has entered into four MOUs that it identifies as
"regulatory MOUs,"''3 but these instruments constitute little more
than information sharing arrangements tailored to the prudential
supervision of particular financial services firms that are subject to
used to support a charge of violation of the laws administered by the requesting
authority).
14, 19
135. But see 1998 Positive Comity Accord, supra note 126,
(distinguishing between providing investigatory assistance to a foreign authority
and conducting enforcement proceedings at the behest of a foreign authority). The
1998 Positive Comity Accord, however, in the context of cooperation in
competition law enforcement, does contemplate enforcement of domestic law for
the benefit of a foreign jurisdiction. See id. A regulatory authority acts on a
positive comity request of a foreign authority by engaging in domestic law
enforcement proceedings to remedy harm occurring in the foreign jurisdiction. See
id. 18.
136. See id. 18 (defining "negative comity" as the consideration that the
judicial authorities of one nation give to the effect that enforcement action may
have on the interests of a foreign jurisdiction).
15(d)(i)
137. See, e.g., SEC-Sing. Enforcement MOU, supra note 133,
(declaring that a request for investigatory assistance may be denied if such
assistance contravenes the domestic law of the requested authority). But see
George C. Nnona, InternationalInsider Trading: Reassessing the Propriety and
Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 185,
198 (2001) (arguing that compelling foreign banks to reveal customer records that
are protected under domestic law implicates international comity concerns in
international insider trading litigation). Prior to the adoption of MOUs, the SEC
relied on MLATs for investigatory assistance in foreign jurisdictions, and MLATs
often contained "dual criminality" clauses, which required the subject matter of the
investigation to implicate the criminal laws of the United States and the foreign
nation providing the assistance. See id. at 199-200; see also Joel R. Paul, Comity in
InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 79 (1991) (arguing that a court's use of
international comity to decline enforcement of otherwise applicable local law has
the effect of protecting the jurisdictional choices of private parties).
138. See SEC, Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators (2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-cooparrangements.htm (last
visited Feb. 4, 2007) (listing and categorizing the MOUs to which the SEC is a
party).
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regulation in multiple jurisdictions. 139 Similar to SEC enforcement
MOUs, they state that they create no legal obligations on the part of
the signatory agencies. 14° The regulatory MOUs permit the SEC to
conduct on-site visits in the territory of a foreign jurisdiction to
ensure compliance with ongoing obligations under U.S. securities
laws.14 ' The innovation of SEC regulatory MOUs is that these
arrangements augment the information sharing provisions of an
enforcement MOU by extending the arm of the SEC compliance and
inspection program 142 such that the SEC may have direct access to
the records of foreign firms that are subject to self-regulatory45
44
organization ("SRO"), 143 broker-dealer,' or clearing organization

139. See Undertaking on Consultation and Cooperation Regarding Belgian
Firms That Are Members of U.S. Clearing Organizations, U.S.-Belg., 1-2, July 6,
2006, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oiabilateral/belgium.pdf
[hereinafter U.S.-Belg. Undertaking] (stating that the Belgian financial regulatory
authority, the CBFA, intends to provide the SEC with information relevant to the
financial condition of Belgian firms that participate in U.S. clearing organizations);
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the
Administration and Enforcement of Securities Laws and Declaration on
Cooperation and Supervision of Cross-Border Investment Management Activity,
U.S.-H.K.,
2-3.9, Oct. 5, 1995, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices
/oia/oiabilateralihongkong.pdf (delineating the terms of assistance in conducting
on-site inspections of financial service providers and explaining the purpose for
consultation between securities authorities in China and Hong Kong);
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation, and the
Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Supervision of
21(a)(1), 23, Mar. 14, 2006, available at
Financial Services Firms, U.S.-U.K.,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oiamultilateral/ukfsamou.pdf [hereinafter
U.S.-U.K. Regulatory MOU] (providing for on-site compliance inspections and
exchange of records pertaining to the financial condition of particular firms).
140. See, e.g., U.S.-Belg. Undertaking, supra note 139, at 2 (stating that the
Undertaking does not create legal obligations, confer rights, or supersede domestic
law).
7(a), 23 (granting the
141. See U.S.-U.K. Regulatory MOU, supra note 139,
SEC the authority to conduct a "routine, sweep, or for-cause regulatory visit to, or
inspection of the books, records, and premises of, a Firm" located in the United
Kingdom).
142. See John H. Walsh, Right The First Time: Regulation, Quality, and
Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 165,
177-84 (1997) (discussing the SEC compliance inspection and examinations
program and the manner in which it promotes market integrity by discouraging
SRO member misconduct). The SEC periodically inspects the records of SROs to
ensure that the SRO is adequately supervising the conduct of SRO members. See
id. at 178.
143. See CFTC On-line Glossary, http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/glossary
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compliance with U.S. securities laws. 46 Essentially, such MOUs
create a joint surveillance program. 147 The SEC's enforcement and
regulatory MOUs thus do not contemplate coordination or
convergence in securities regulation proper. 48 Rather, these
arrangements seek to circumvent the slow process of information
sharing under mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLATs"), 49 while
minimizing the potential for jurisdictional conflict that would arise if
a court were to compel the production of documents in a foreign
jurisdiction.'5

/glossarys.html#selfregulatory (last updated Sept. 4, 2007) (defining SROs as
"exchanges and registered futures associations that enforce financial and sales
practice requirements for their members"); Brandon Becker, A Regulatory
Perspective on The Global Securities Market, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 309, 310
(1987) (discussing the complexity of SRO oversight where there are international
linkages between securities markets operating as SROs).
144. See Walsh, supra note 142, at 170-71 (discussing supervisory requirements
of broker-dealers over their employees).
145. See generally Benn Steil, InternationalSecurities Markets Regulation, in
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION 209, 214-18 (Benn Steil ed.,
John Wiley & Sons 1994) (explaining the components of a clearance and
settlement system for securities transactions). The risks involved in cross-border
securities transactions increase where divergent standards exist to determine
specifics such as the moment at which ownership of a subject security arises during
an international transaction. See id. at 216-17.
146. See Becker, supra note 143, at 311-12 (characterizing the SEC-FSA MOU
as a "surveillance sharing procedure").
147. See id
148. But see Slaughter, supra note 132, at 292-93 (explaining how networks,
regardless of whether the network has the purpose of converging regulation, will
influence the policy and enforcement approaches of regulators and tend to bring
about a degree of convergence).
149. See Nnona, supra note 137, at 199-200.
150. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 2020, 2040 (outlining documents the state must make available to
foreign authorities); Swiss Supreme Court Opinion Concerning Judicial Assistance
in the Santa Fe Case, 22 I.L.M. 785, 795 (1983) (holding that the U.S. DOJ request
for judicial assistance from Swiss Courts in compelling the production of
documents from Swiss banks does not meet the compulsory measures requirement
of the Treaty because insider transactions qualify as neither unfaithful management
nor fraud under Swiss law); Paul G. Mahoney, Securities Regulation By
Enforcement: An InternationalPerspective, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 305, 317 n.60, 318
(1990) (discussing the conflicts between the SEC and Swiss courts in early insider
trading cases for which Swiss courts refused to compel the production of
documents under the United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters).
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2. The Euronext Regulatory MOUIs Not Merely a Statement of
Intent, but Rather Creates Independent Regulatory Obligationsfor
Euronext
The primary concern of the Euronext Regulatory MOU, on the
other hand, is the establishment of a "coherent" regulatory

framework for Euronext markets. 1 ' The Euronext Regulatory MOU
only cursorily touches upon enforcement-related information sharing
and surveillance of the activities of market participants for
compliance purposes.152 Filling that role is the Federation of
European Securities
Commissions
("FESCO")
Multilateral
5
3
Memorandum of Understanding,'
which already delineated the
terms of enforcement and compliance cooperation among European
securities regulators at the time the Euronext Regulatory MOU was
drafted.' 54 Further, the Euronext Regulatory MOU does not state in
terms that it is not binding,'5 5 as is the case with all MOUs to which

151. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. I (outlining the
principles and objectives of cooperation by the College of Euronext Regulators).
152. See id.art. X.
153. See Committee of European Securities Regulators, Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance
of Securities Activities art. 3 (Jan. 26, 1999), available at http://www.cesreu.org/popup2.php?id=190
(detailing the scope of mutual assistance in
enforcement, monitoring, and investigation required from members of the
FESCO); Corcoran & Hart, supra note 47, at 281-82 (discussing the activities of
FESCO). CESR superseded FESCO as a cooperative forum and gained a mandate
to advise the European Commission on proposed EC securities legislation. See
John F. Mogg, European Union Law Essays: Regulating Financial Services in
Europe: A New Approach, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 58, 73-74 (2002) (discussing
the role of CESR in providing advice to the European Commission on the drafting
of EC securities legislation under the Lamfalussy Process).
154. See Committee of European Securities Regulators, The Role of CESR at
"Level 3" Under The Lamfalussy Process: Action Plan For 2005 CESR/04-527b
1.2 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=2550
[hereinafter Role of CESR at "Level 3"] (contrasting the cooperation dynamic
among regulators in FESCO with the heightened cooperation mandate of CESR).
CESR's Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of
Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities has succeeded the FESCO
MMOU. See Committee of European Securities Regulators, Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance
of Securities Activities CESR/05-335 (May 2005), available at http://www.cesreu.org/popup2. php?id=190.
155. See generally Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12.
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the SEC is a party.'5 6 Indeed, the language used in portions of the
document suggests that, at the very least, the MOU does not disclaim
that its provisions create legal obligations on the part of Euronext or
the signatory authorities.' 57
The agreement is the foundational document of the Euronext
College.' 58 The Euronext College consists of a Chairman's
Committee'59 and a Steering Committee, 6 ° which has authority under
the MOU to create working parties 6' to address particular aspects of
the coordinated regulation of Euronext. The Chairmen's Committee
consists of the Chairmen of the regulatory authorities that are party
to the MOU. 162 Significantly, the MOU identifies particular actions,
decisions, and events which require that Euronext obtain prior

156. See id. (regarding non-binding nature of SEC MOUs).
157. See id. at pmbl. ("[W]hereas each of the authorities involved adheres to this
MOU and will perform the functions that correspond to the powers conferred upon
it by its national laws."); id. art. XI,
11.3 (the French, English, and Dutch
versions of this MOU "are deemed to have an equal legal value"); id at pmbl.
(defining how the authorities "intend to exercise their responsibilities with respect
to the co-ordinated regulation and supervision of Euronext").
158. See NYSE EURONEXT PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at A-15 (defining the
College of Euronext Regulators).
159. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. I, 1.1 (stating that the
Chairmen's Committee consists of the Chairmen of the regulatory authorities that
are party to the MOU).
160. See id. art. I,
1.2. (stating that the Steering Committee prepares the
meetings of the Chairmen's Committee).
161. See id. (granting the Steering Committee authority to create working
parties).
162. See id. art. I,
1.1 (stating that the Chairmen of the full signatory
authorities comprise the Chairmen's Committee). Currently, the Chairmen's
Committee is composed of the Chairmen of the French AMF, the Netherlands
AFM, the Belgian CBFA, the Portuguese CMVM, and the U.K. FSA; NYSE
EURONEXT PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at 134 (defining the Committee of
Chairmen of the College). The MOU provides that a regulatory authority that has
jurisdiction over any new trading markets that Euronext might acquire can become
a party to the MOU and participate in the regulatory coordination of the College.
See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. XI,
11.5. Euronext
Amsterdam N.V. and Euronext Brussels Market Authority, two of the market
operator subsidiaries of Euronext N.V., are associated signatory authorities to the
MOU, but as such are not participants in the Chairmen's Committee. See id. at
pmbl. Thus, the College as regulator takes decisions at arm's length from the
regulated entity, demonstrating that the drafters of the MOU were mindful of the
dangers of regulatory capture. See id art. VII, 7.1.

AM. U.INT'L L. REV.

[23:387

approval163 or non-opposition 164 from the Euronext College, or notify
the Steering Committee of the Euronext College of the occurrence of
such events. 165 Thus, where a Euronext securities market takes action
or makes a decision that falls within a review competence 166 of the
Euronext College, Euronext must submit that decision or action for
the review of the Euronext College as if it were a free-standing
regulatory body. 167 Such obligations are independent of national level
obligations to submit such action or decision for review to the
securities regulator with authority over the particular jurisdiction in
which the Euronext market that is taking the action or decision is
located.' 68 Thus, Euronext's obligation to the Euronext College is
independent and additional to its obligations to comply with national
law. 169

163. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. II, 2.1.
164. See id. art. III, 3.1.
165. See id.art. IV, 4.1. Euronext must notify the Steering Committee of the
admission, sanction, suspension, or exclusion of a market member, or the listing or
delisting of, or suspension of trading in, a financial instrument. See id art. IV,
paras. 4.1.1-4.1.2.
166. See id arts. II-IV (describing the prior approval, non-opposition, and
notification competences of the College).
167. See NYSE EURONEXT PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at 194 (stating that the
Chairmen's Committee of the College takes decisions by consensus).
168. See Euronext Letter, supra note 68 (stating that Euronext's submissions to
the College regarding the NYSE Euronext merger, which the College is required to
review under Article 2.1.3, are adequate, but that such submissions in no way
operate to satisfy obligations to the national securities authorities that may exist
under national law); see also Press Release, Autorit6 des marches financiers,
France, Euronext Regulators Committee: Constitution of An Ad Hoc Committee
on Projected Mergers Between Euronext and Other Market Operators (June 29,
2006), available at www.amf-france.org/documents/general/7189_1.pdf (stating
that Euronext must obtain domestic authorization for its merger with the NYSE
independently of the approval granted by the College).
169. See generally EURONEXT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 163-64
(listing the competences of the national securities authorities that have jurisdiction
over Euronext's Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and Paris markets, and the London
International Finance Futures and Options Exchange ("LIFFE")). Under Dutch law
Euronext must also obtain prior approval of the Netherlands AFM for the adoption
of its Rulebooks. See id.at 163. The French AMF also must approve the
Rulebooks of regulated markets. See id. at 164. See generally Guido Ferrarini,
Exchange Governance and Regulation: An Overview, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES
MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 248-51 (Guido

Ferrarini, ed., Kluwer Law International 1998) (discussing the modification of
Belgian, French, and Dutch law pertaining to the regulation of exchanges in
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Decisions at the Chairmen's Committee are taken by consensus. 70
The regulatory relationship of each individual Euronext market
operator with the securities authority in the relevant jurisdiction is
thereby altered because events that trigger the prior approval or nonobjection obligations will require the involvement of the entire
Euronext College. 7 ' Despite the convergence in EC securities
regulation that has taken place thus far, European regulatory
authorities nevertheless have significantly divergent regulatory
approaches to securities markets.'7 2 One can expect that Euronext
College review of a proposed change of the Euronext Rulebook or
the issuance of an interpretation of those rules is not certain to yield
the same results as would obtain if the home country regulator alone
were to review the measure pursuant to applicable domestic law. 73
On the one hand, Euronext is subject to regulatory oversight that is
not dictated exclusively by the national law of any jurisdiction in
which Euronext operates, but on the other hand, there was no EC
securities legislation directly on point when the Euronext College
was created.I74 Euronext was thus operating in a regulatory gap in the
response to the provisions of the ISD and the implementation of the ISD's mandate
to treat exchanges as "regulated markets").
170. See NYSE EURONEXT PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at 194 (stating that the
Chairmen's Committee of the College takes decisions by consensus).
171. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. II, 2.1.
172. See, e.g., Yannis V. Avgerinos, The Need and the Rationalefor a European
Securities Regulator, in FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A SINGLE
REGULATOR?, supra note 3, at 164-65 (discussing FSA's comments regarding the
perceived impossibility of harmonizing U.K. and German regulation of
exchanges).
2.1 (listing
173. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. II,
decisions subject to prior approval of the Euronext College); id art. III, 3.1
(listing decisions subject to non-opposition by the Euronext College).
174. Compare Investment Services Directive, supra note 87, art. 23.3 (directing
Member State authorities to "collaborate closely in order more effectively to
discharge their respective responsibilities in the area covered by this Directive" in
cases where investment firms had established operations in multiple Member
States), with Markets in Fin. Instruments Directive, supra note 18, art. 56.2
(requiring home and host Member States to "establish proportionate cooperation
arrangements" for the supervision of regulated markets, where the operations of a
regulated market in a host state are of "substantial importance" for the securities
markets of the host state). Thus, the regulatory cooperation provisions of the ISD
were clearly more modest and limited to supervision of investment firms, while the
regulatory cooperation provisions of the MiFID are applicable to regulated markets
as well.
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EC securities regime and the Euronext Regulatory MOU was
concluded to fill this gap. 175

No less significant is the fact that the parties to the MOU have
treated the instrument as creating positive legal obligations. 76 The
Prospectus of NYSE Euronext, Inc. ("NYSE Euronext Prospectus")
states that the Euronext College must approve the NYSE Euronext
combination before the filing and commencement of the tender offer
that will consummate the merger of the NYSE and Euronext. 177 The
MOU thus appears to have created legal obligations that Euronext
and the NYSE are willing to recognize, even if the MOU is not a

175. Cf Wymeersch Working Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that regulators in
the field of prudential supervision of financial conglomerates had begun to
coordinate action through MOUs); see also MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 881-82
(stating that the co-operation procedures contained in EC financial markets
directives have compelled national regulators to enter into MOUs to organize
cooperative efforts). Professor Wymeersch refers to the use of MOUs to coordinate
harmonization efforts as "contractually organized" supervision, particularly in
cases where market participants are included in the regulatory dialogue of the
MOU. See Wymeersch Working Paper, supra note 3, at 3. But see Susanne

Bergstraesser, Cooperation Between Supervisors, in

EUROPEAN SECURITIES
MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND, supra note 169,

at 378-80 (suggesting that MOUs delineating the terms of information exchange
should not be necessary in a field regulated by E.U. directives, as such directives
would provide the terms of information exchange and oblige the regulatory
authorities to exchange information on those terms). However, it is clear that the
Euronext Regulatory MOU is not limited to information exchange. Indeed, and as
Bergstraesser concedes, MOUs are a useful mechanism for facilitating intensive
collaboration between regulators on a project that requires joint effort. See id at
379 (discussing the advantages of cooperation among banking authorities to
achieve the mandates of the Second Banking Coordination Directive).
Harmonization of the complicated web of rules that constitutes EC securities
regulation will require intensive collaboration and joint efforts, and this is precisely
what the MOU seeks to facilitate through the Chairmen's and Steering Committees
of the College.
176. See NYSE EURONEXT PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at 148-51 (outlining the
conditions that each party must fulfill before the NYSE Euronext combination can
occur).
177. See id. at 134 (discussing the regulatory approvals necessary to complete
the NYSE Euronext combination). Article II of the Euronext Regulatory MOU
requires that Euronext obtain the prior approval of the Chairmen's Committee for
"[a]lliances, mergers, cross shareholdings (major acquisitions) and cross
membership agreements which could occur at the level of Euronext N.V. or at the
level of its subsidiaries." See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. II,
2.1.3.
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binding international arrangement between the regulatory authorities
themselves.178
3. The Euronext Regulatory MOU Is an Outgrowth of Harmonization
Frameworkof the Single European Act & Investment Services
Directive
The Euronext Regulatory MOU is remarkable for the innovative
cooperative relationship that it establishes with industry 7 9 to
facilitate convergence in EC securities regulation. 80 Yet the
arrangement strikes a surprisingly skeptical tone towards such
convergence in light of EC legislation' 8 ' that directs Member States
to harmonize domestic securities law."' An analysis of the
178. Cf Markets in Fin. Instruments Directive, supra note 18, art. 56.2
(establishing an obligation for securities authorities of Member States to
cooperate). The MiFID has provisions that may cause contractual supervisory
arrangements such as the Euronext Regulatory MOU to rise to the level of binding
obligations under E.U. law. See id.
179. See supra notes 59, 158-69 and accompanying text (discussing the
bifurcated Committee structure of the College and its arm's length collaborative
relationship with Euronext regulated markets).
180. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, pmbl., recital 1 ("Having
regard to the E.U. Directives in the securities field and the co-operation mechanism
established by them.").
181. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction
between directives and regulations and the EC Treaty basis of the ISD and the
MiFID).
182. Compare Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. VII, 7.1 (stating
that the regulatory authorities are undertaking their "best efforts" at harmonizing
national regulation of listing requirements, prospectuses, on-going obligations of
listed companies, take over bids, and disclosure of large shareholdings), with
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on Upgrading the Investment Services Directive (93/22/EEC), at 8, COM (2000)
729 final (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/
securities/docs/isd/2000/com-provisionen.pdf [hereinafter Upgrading the ISD]
(stating that Articles 22-27 of ISD establish minimum levels of convergence of
supervisory responsibilities). However, nether the ISD nor preceding financial
markets directives had yet to establish in a legislative instrument a framework for
EC level stock exchange regulation. See generally Andrew Whittaker, A European
Law for Regulated Markets? Some Personal Views, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES
MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND, supra note 169,
at 269-73 (discussing the absence in the ISD of numerous provisions necessary for
appropriate exchange regulation). Thus, the new MiFID, which replaces the ISD, is
intended to remedy the shortcomings of the ISD in exchange regulation and
expand on the ISD's role in spurring the development of European ATSs. See
Markets in Fin. Instruments Directive, supra note 18, pmbl., recitals 1, 2
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framework that the Euronext Regulatory MOU establishes for
cooperation reveals that this skeptical tone is an echo of the EC
framework for securities law harmonization that existed prior to the
83
adoption of the Lamfalussy Process.
More remarkable still is the role that the SEA has played in
supplying a harmonization framework for the regulation of securities
trading markets.' 84 Because the business structure of and competitive
relationship between European securities exchanges changed
"'
dramatically in the era during and after the adoption of the ISD, 85

(explaining the changes that have occurred in European markets since the adoption
of the ISD and the necessity for comprehensive legislation for the regulation of
exchanges); see also Avgouleas, supra note 3, at 188-91 (discussing the
inadequacy of the ISD in light of competition between automated and traditional
exchanges).
183. See generally Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 4-6 (outlining a
proposal for a new approach to EC securities legislation to combat the dilemma of
inconsistent national level rule implementation). The Wise Men recognized that the
harmonization framework of the Single European Act, which was based on mutual
recognition, minimum harmonization, and home country control, had failed to
yield an adequate degree of harmonization among the rules that ultimately applied
to market participants. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 13-16 (discussing the extent
to which the EC has adopted legislation that mandates different degrees of
harmonization in Member State law). Thus, the implication of the Lamfalussy
distinction between Level 1 framework principles and Level 2 implementing
measures is that EC securities legislation directed towards minimum harmonization
had failed to provide adequate guidance to the national authorities as to the result
that national implementing legislation must achieve. See id at 861-62.
184. See Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
185. See generally Marco Pagano, The Changing Microstructure of European
Equity Markets, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES
DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND, supra note 169, at 200-04 (discussing the influence of
U.K. deregulation on the competitive relationship among European trading
systems). Changes in the structure of European trading markets were a
consequence of both the competition among national rules, which was spurred by
U.K. deregulation, as well as the ISD's provisions pertaining to "regulated
markets." See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the hesitancy of
Member States to embark on an EC trading markets regime in light of the
divergence of market structures among Member States). Because the ISD permits a
trading market to establish remote trading screens in other Member States, there
was a fear that such trading screens could in effect establish new trading markets
that did not require the approval and supervision of the jurisdiction in which they
were established. See Steil, supra note 96, at 129-30; see also Stephen M.
Schaefer, Competition Between Regulated Markets in London, in EUROPEAN
SECURITIES MARKETS:

THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND,

supra note 169, at 211-12 (evaluating the "unbundling" of listing, clearing and
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and because the corpus of EC securities regulation contained no
single directive applicable to exchange regulation, 8 6 E.U. Member
State regulators were faced with a significant regulatory challenge
when Euronext merged the exchanges of Amsterdam, Brussels, and
"' EC securities directives supplied a general imperative to
Paris. 87
harmonize regulation,' 88 yet the ISD did not provide a comprehensive
framework for the regulation of exchanges. 8 9 Rather, the ISD was
primarily intended to harmonize Member State regulation of
investment firms.190
But securities exchanges had begun to demutualize and adapt
technology to trading, thus creating the possibility that a trader
located in one Member State could participate remotely in an

settlement, regulation, and pricing information services as a result of the ISD's
provisions permitting investment firms to remotely access regulated markets in
other Member States).
186. See Markets in Fin. Instruments Directive, supra note 18, recital 1 (the ISD
focused on the regulation of services provided by banks and investment firms); see
also Whittaker, supra note 182, at 271 (comparing ISD provisions pertaining to
"regulated markets" with the requirements for recognition as an "investment
exchange" under the U.K.'s 1986 Financial Services Act). Of course, the MiFID
has superseded the ISD as the EC instrument for the harmonization of investment
services and exchange regulation. See Markets in Fin. Instruments Directive, supra
note 18, recital 1.
187. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text (discussing Euronext's
consolidation of western European securities exchanges).
188. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, pmbl., recital I (stating that
the MOU should be understood within the context of the cooperative arrangements
contained in EC securities directives). The EC securities directives do not contain
imperatives to conclude MOUs to facilitate cooperation. See Bergstraesser, supra
note 175, at 379 (the ISD does not discuss the conclusion of MOUs between
regulatory agencies). Rather, the imperative to collaborate on supervision is more
generalized. See Upgradingthe ISD, supra note 182, at 8 (noting that ISD Articles
22-27 call on regulators clearly to divide supervisory responsibilities among
themselves). ISD Article 23.3, for instance, provides that, where an investment
firm operates in multiple E.U. jurisdictions, the Member State regulators must
collaborate closely to effectively discharge their responsibilities under the
Directive. See Investment Services Directive, supra note 87, art. 23.3.
189. See, e.g., MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 647-48 (characterizing the extent of
EC securities trading-market regulation as "light" and stating that EC exchange
regulation largely is confined to the ISD).
190. See Markets in Fin. Instruments Directive, supra note 18, recital 1
(describing the ISD as largely limited to harmonizing rules of authorization and
operating requirements for investment firms).
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exchange located in another Member State. 9 Trading in securities is
an investment service that implicates the EC Treaty freedom to

9 3 in all E.U. Member States. 9 4
establish 92 and to provide services

The difficulty in formulating the ISD was essentially that it was
impossible for the EC to provide for the freedom of investment firms
to access foreign exchanges' 95 without providing its logical
counterpart-the freedom of exchanges to provide remote access to
trading. 96 The logical impossibility of decoupling these two
freedoms required the ISD to contain provisions pertaining to
regulated markets. 1 And yet the hesitancy of Member States'98 at
191. See Pagano & Steil, supra note 17, at 40-42 (noting that the expansion of
an exchange's member base, by attracting remote members through electronic
trading screens, enhances the liquidity of an exchange while lowering transaction
costs). The Stockholm Stock Exchange was the first European exchange to take
advantage of the ISD's remote membership provisions. See id. at 41.
192. See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 43.
193. See id.art. 49.
194. See generally MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 311-27 (discussing the
applicability to investment intermediaries of the EC Treaty freedom to establish
and freedom to provide services). It is also not insignificant that, prior to the
demutualization and automation of exchanges, the Community decisionmaker was
hard pressed to identify a legal basis in the EC Treaty for legislation that sought to
regulate generally the operation of securities exchanges, which largely functioned
as non-profit associations. Cf supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text
(discussing the varying legal bases of EC securities legislation).
195. Investment Services Directive, supra note 87, art. 15.1. See generally
MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 658-63 (describing the "access passport" of ISD
Article 15). ISD Article 15 requires that a Member State ensure an ISD investment
firm's access to a regulated market located in that Member State, provided that the
ISD investment firm has obtained authorization as an investment intermediary in
its home state. See id. at 658.
196. See Steil, supra note 96, at 129 (stating that designation as a "regulated
market" under the ISD presented competitive advantages for exchanges). ISD
Article 15.4 requires a home Member State to permit a regulated market that is
located in a host Member State to provide "appropriate facilities" such that an
investment firm in the home state may trade in that regulated market without being
physically present at that market. See Investment Services Directive, supra note 87,
art. 15.4. These twin access passports essentially would decouple the investment
firm's freedom to provide services from its freedom of establishment. See id.
197. See Upgradingthe ISD, supra note 182, at 7-8 (stating that the freedom of
regulated exchanges to place remote trading screens in Member States is a
corollary to the Article 14 "passport" that investment firms have to provide
services in Member States); see also Corcoran & Hart, supra note 47, at 239-40
(stating that the right of an investment firm to provide services throughout the
common market creates a concomitant necessity that a regulated market facilitate
the realization of that right by providing remote access). But see MOLONEY, supra
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that time to establish a comprehensive regime for EC regulation of
trading markets meant that the ISD's provisions on regulated markets
were poorly defined.' 99 Because of the lack of clarity regarding the
role of the ISD concept of "regulated market" in EC securities
regulation,2 °° the ISD created a regulatory vacuum in the area of
trading markets.2"'
The Euronext College adapted to this regulatory vacuum by
importing the tripartite harmonization framework of the SEA 20 2 to
exchange regulation via the cooperative arrangement outlined in the
Euronext Regulatory MOU. 203 The ISD is structured, upon the

note 1, at 660 & n.66 (stating that the "remote-access passport" of regulated
markets and the investment firm passport operate independently of one another).
Professor Ferrarini suggests that when a regulated market provides remote access
to an investment firm operating within its home state the investment firm passport
itself, and its concomitant notification obligation, is not implicated. See id.
198. See Steil, supra note 96, at 124-25 (identifying two points of dispute
between Member States regarding the inclusion of trading market provisions in the
draft ISD: whether to confine trading to established exchanges and on what terms
to require reporting of transactions); see also MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 653
(discussing the influence of divergent market structures on the conflict as to
whether the ISD should include detailed provisions regarding trading markets).
199. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 656 (contrasting the detailed treatment of
investment firms in the ISD with the absence in the ISD of a provision defining the
characteristics of a trading market). Much of this can be attributed to the
substantial divergence in market structures among the Member States. See Pagano
& Steil, supra note 17, at 12-20 (contrasting the trading infrastructures of the
Amsterdam, Brussels, Madrid, Milan, and Paris exchanges in the early 1990's).
200. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Investment Services and Regulated Markets, at 5, COM (2002) 625 final (Nov.
19, 2002) (stating that the ISD is inadequate for harmonizing securities trading
markets because it does not establish clear rules for consolidation of and
competition between trading infrastructures). The European Commission
characterized
the ISD's provisions
regarding regulated
markets
as
"underdeveloped." See id. at 6.
201. See id at 32 (stating that ISD provisions on regulatory cooperation were
created for an EC-wide trading environment that was substantially less integrated).
202. See Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1; Avgouleas, supra note 3, at
182-84 (discussing the limitations of the SEA framework for harmonizing Member
State regulation).
203. Cf Request for Comment, Boards of Trade Located Outside of the United
States and the Requirement to Become a Designated Contract Market or
Derivatives Transaction Execution Facility, 71 Fed. Reg. 113, 34072-74 (June 13,
2006) (seeking comment on a threshold U.S. "contact level" at which a foreign
board of trade ("FBOT") would be required to register with the CFTC). The CFTC
is currently reevaluating its criteria for requiring FBOTs to register to conduct
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harmonization framework that the SEA originally implemented:
minimum harmonization of standards accompanied by mutual
recognition and home country control. 0 4 The Euronext Regulatory
MOU framework applies these harmonization principles to exchange
regulation.2 °5
The Euronext Regulatory MOU provides that the Euronext
College will endeavor to harmonize regulation of listing
requirements, prospectuses, ongoing obligations of listed companies,
takeover bids, and disclosure of large shareholdings.20 6 This reflects
the minimum harmonization principle that ensures the viability of
mutual recognition and home country control. 20 7 The MOU also
provides that, while listing on a Euronext exchange is predicated on

business in the United States, and thus is modifying its regulatory approach to fill a
type of "regulatory vacuum." See id.; see also Transcript of Hearing on What
Constitutes a Board of Trade Located Outside of the United States Under the
Commodity Exchange Act Section 4(a), at 80-81, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (June 27, 2006) (statement of Michael Gorham, Director, Illinois Inst.
of Tech., Ctr. for Fin. Markets), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/opa
/opafbotpublichearingtranscript062706.pdf (arguing that CFTC requirements that a
board of trade report large trades and limit the size of positions that traders can
hold in a product deter traders from operating through CFTC registered
exchanges).
204. See Lastra, supra note 36, at 60-61 (tracing the origins of the SEA's threepart harmonization framework to the 1985 White Paper). The use of directives,
which require implementation in national law, rather than regulations, which have
direct effect in E.U. Member States, was preferred out of ambivalence over the
strength of the EC Treaty mandate to create a unified, rather than common market.
See generally Pescatore, supra note 99, at 9-18 (criticizing the SEA for renouncing
the mandate of full harmonization and arguing that the EC had made more progress
towards creating a common market than generally had been appreciated). The use
of directives also serves as a conciliatory gesture towards the principle of
subsidiarity. See Lastra, supra note 36, at 61 n.39 (identifying the relationship
between the SEA and the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam Protocols).
205. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text (explaining how the
Euronext Regulatory MOU applies and exceeds the minimum harmonization
standards of EC legislation).
206. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. VII, 7.1 (providing
that the general thrust of cooperation in the Euronext College is the authorities'
"best efforts" to harmonize regulation).
207. See generally MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 14-15 (describing the minimum
harmonization element as permitting a degree of regulatory competition, while
preventing competition between regulators that might result in inadequate
protections).
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the approval by one Euronext College regulator, the Euronext
College will apply a "streamlined mutual recognition procedure" for
offerings in multiple Euronext jurisdictions. 2°8 This is a clear
application of the mutual recognition principle. 20 9 The MOU also
ventures a definition of "public offering. ' 210° However, at the time the
MOU was drafted, the determination of whether a public offer had
taken place was not yet a settled issue in EC securities market
legislation.21 Thus, again, the Euronext Regulatory MOU appears to
be filling gaps in Community law.
The final element of the SEA harmonization framework that is
mirrored in the Euronext Regulatory MOU is home country control.
2 2
The ISD employed the home country control element extensively,
and the later Prospectus Directive 2 13 replaced the mutual recognition

208. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. VII, 7.2.
209. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 69 (stating that a host Member State must
recognize a document that meets the regulatory requirements of the issuer's home
country if the home country has complied with the minimum harmonization
mandates of an EC directive that pertains to the content or approval process of
such document). The host state may impose additional language and translation
requirements, however, and Euronext Regulatory MOU Article 7.2 provides for
this as well. Compare id.at 69 (host states may impose additional language
requirements), with Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. VII, 7.2 (the
streamlined mutual recognition procedure is subject to domestic language
requirements).
210. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. VII,
7.2 ("The mere
fact of being listed on a regulated market in one of the jurisdictions involved does
not necessarily constitute a public offering in the other jurisdictions.").
211. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Prospectus to be Published When Securities Are Offered to
the Public or Admitted to Trading, at 7-8, COM (2001) 280 final (May 30, 2001)
(stating that the definition of "public offer" was inconsistent both before and after
the adoption of the Prospectus Directive, 89/298/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8)); see
also MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 177-84, 221-22 (characterizing the definition of
public offer as a lacuna in the EC disclosure system). It is also not clear whether
the Article 7.2 "definition" of public offer is intended to be an interpretation of that
term as it is used in EC securities directives or an interpretation of the manner in
which the national authorities intend to interpret their domestic law concerning
public offerings. See id.
212. See Investment Services Directive, supra note 87, art. 23.3 (declaring that
the success of the harmonization of intemal market rules is dependent on the "grant
of a single authorization valid throughout the Community and the application of
the principle of home Member State supervision").
213. Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC) [hereinafter
Prospectus Directive].

434

AM. U. INT' L. REV.

[23:387

approach with exclusive home country control. 2 4 But the Prospectus
Directive was still in development at the time Euronext was
created.2 5 The Euronext Regulatory MOU applies home country
21 6
control to ongoing disclosure obligations of Euronext listed issuers
and, in addition, adopts the term of art created in the ISD"regulated market"2 7 -to assist in determining the competent home
country authority. Again, the Euronext Regulatory MOU appears to
reach into the patchwork of EC securities legislation to piece
together a framework for regulating trading markets.2 l8 The MOU
also provides for negotiation between College regulators on the
identification of a home country supervisor in the case of companies
listed in multiple jurisdictions, or in a jurisdiction other than that of
incorporation.1 9
214. See MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 227-29 (comparing the use of home country
control in the ISD with its adoption as a control mechanism in the Prospectus
Proposal).
215. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Welcomes
Council's Adoption of Prospectuses Directive (July 15, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1018&format=HT
ML&aged=l&language=en&guiLanguage=en. Two years elapsed between the
proposal and adoption of the Directive. See id.
216. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. VII, 7.3 (identifying
the competent authority of the regulated market where the issuer is primarily listed
as responsible for supervising ongoing disclosure obligations).
217. See Steil, supra note 96, at 115-16 (discussing the development of the
concept of "regulated market" during the drafting of the ISD). The French
distinguished between markets that respected the principles of transparency,
fairness, and security and those that essentially were over-the-counter ("OTC")
markets. See id. The French desired that the access privileges that the ISD was to
grant to investment firms and exchanges would be limited to markets that
respected such principles. See id.
218. See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text (discussing how the
regulations regarding home country control in the MOU are yet another example of
how the MOU compliments EC securities legislation).
219. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. VII, 7.4 (concerning
take-over bids). The Prospectus Directive also contains guidance as to the
identification of a home Member State supervisor. See Prospectus Directive, supra
note 213, pmbl., art. 14 (stating that the home Member State should be "the one
best placed to regulate the issuer for the purposes of this Directive"). One can
easily see how multiple directives with divergent interpretations of "home
supervisor" could subject a single issuer to "home country control" by multiple
supervisors. Compare id. with Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. VII,
7.4. The negotiation procedure in the Euronext College can thus serve to alleviate
this divergence. Cf Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Member of the Executive Board,
European Central Bank, Lecture at the London School of Economics, Financial
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Thus, it appears that the Euronext College gathered a framework
for harmonizing trading market rules from the "regulated market"
provisions of the ISD, as well as the general harmonization
framework of the SEA and the directives pertaining to issuer
disclosure that were in development at the time of the Euronext
merger. The arrangement was an innovative response to the
innovative trading market model that Euronext had created. This
cycle of deregulation, demutualization, technological adaptation, and
reregulation is consistent with that outlined above.
B. THE RULE HARMONIZATION PROCESS OF THE EURONEXT
REGULATORY MOU DIMINISHES THE PROBLEM OF INCONSISTENT
RULE IMPLEMENTATION

The Wise Men reported that one of the most significant
impediments to the establishment of a single market in financial
services was inconsistent national level implementation of EC
securities directives.2 2 ° The Wise Men attributed inconsistency in
implementation of directives to a number of factors, including
ambiguity in the text of directives,2"2 ' the nature of the directive
itself,2 22 as well as a lack of coordination among the administrative

Markets Group: EMU and Banking Supervision (Feb. 24, 1999), available at
(stating that the
http://www.ecb.intlpress/key/date/1999/html/sp990224.en.html
implementation of the Second Banking Coordination Directive required banking
authorities to negotiate MOUs to determine satisfactorily which regulators were
"home" and which were "host" authorities).
220. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 18 (stating that inconsistent
implementation of EC legislation is "severely handicapping the emergence of a
pan-European market"); see also supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text
(discussing the findings of the Wise Men and the recommended four-Level
approach to the adoption of EC securities legislation and the monitoring of national
level implementation).
221. See Initial Lamfalussy Report, supra note 34, at 18 (stating that lobbying
efforts and compromises among Member States during the legislative process often
result in a directive that lacks a clear legislative vision).
222. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (contrasting the directive
with the regulation as a legislative instrument). Because the directive is binding
only as to the result to be achieved, and because the text of directives is often
ambiguous regarding this result, it is not surprising that such legislation has seen
inconsistent implementation by Member States. See id.
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authorities charged with implementing and enforcing the national
laws.223
While the Wise Men's proposals for modifying the EC legislative
process have addressed the inadequacies of EC securities legislation
itself, and while the creation of CESR surely will assist the
Commission in crafting legislation at Level 2 that recognizes the
variations among national markets,224 there remains the problem of
inconsistent transposition of securities directives into national law, as
well as inconsistency among Member States in the administration
and enforcement of national laws that have been modified pursuant
to EC securities directives. 2 5 CESR is tasked with facilitating this
process, but there are doubts as to the legal basis of CESRparticularly regarding its role in facilitating the modification of
national laws. 226 This is a consequence of the fact that the EC Treaty
does not grant the Community decisionmaker the authority to change
national law, 227 but only to enact regulations that will supersede
national law, or directives that create an obligation on the part of the
Member State to modify national law to achieve the objectives of the
directive. Because CESR is an E.U. institution, and because its
collaborative role at Level 3 under the Lamfalussy Process implies
that CESR is participating in the modification of national law,228
223. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 15 (decrying the lack of

effective coordination among Member State regulators).
224. See Himalaya Report, supra note 41, at 2-3 (lauding the work of CESR).
CESR has two "hats": at Level 2 under the Lamfalussy Process CESR assists in the
development of the legislation, and at Level 3 CESR assists national authorities in
the consistent implementation of the legislation. See Final Lamfalussy Report,
supra note 7, at 31.
225. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 37 (discussing the role of
CESR at Level 3 in facilitating the consistent transposition, administration, and
enforcement of national laws pursuant to EC securities directives).
226. See Himalaya Report, supra note 41, at 2 (referring to doubts regarding the
EC Treaty legal basis of CESR).

227. See Role of CESR at "Level 3", supra note 154, at 7-8 (stating that the
responsibility for transposing directives lies with the Member States, and that the
national regulators often have a significant role in assisting the national legislatures
in the development of national laws that implement the securities directives). But
see Case C-106/89, Marleasing v. Comercial Intemacional de Alimentacion, 1990
E.C.R. 1-4135 (holding that national courts are obliged to interpret national law "in
light of the wording and the purpose" of E.U. directives).
228. See supra notes 114, 116 and accompanying text (discussing Level 3 of the
Lamfalussy Process). See generally Role of CESR at "Level 3", supra note 154, at
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there is a suspicion that CESR is undertaking a competence that the
29
EC Treaty does not confer on the Community decisionmaker.
The collaborative mechanisms of the Euronext College, however,
provide amply for ensuring convergence in securities trading markets
regulation without implicating the concern that EC bodies are acting
beyond their EC Treaty competences. This is because the Euronext
College is not itself an E.U. institution, but merely a collection of
national supervisors that cite as their common objective the
attainment of the goals of EC securities directives. 230 The Euronext
College approach to harmonization of securities trading markets
regulation is thus well suited to the EC Treaty principle of
subsidiarity and is therefore an excellent vehicle for harmonizing
Member State securities law without implicating EC Treaty
subsidiarity concerns.
Reliance on established regulatory authorities rather than newly
established EC authorities has the additional benefit of clarity in
regards to which agency possesses regulatory authority.23' The
proliferation of financial market regulators at the national level in
E.U. Member States already has caused confusion as to which
national level financial markets authority is responsible for ensuring
the proper implementation of EC securities legislation. 232 At the same
time, however, EC securities legislation has arrived in some E.U.

3-4 (delineating CESR's role in facilitating consistent transposition of directives
into national law as falling in the following areas: the production of administrative
guidelines, interpretive recommendations, common standards, peer reviews, and
comparisons of regulatory practice).
229. See Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, Third Report Monitoring The
Lamfalussy

Process

25-33

(Nov.

17,

2004),

available

at

http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/securities/docs/monitoring/third-report/20041l-monitoringen.pdf [hereinafter IIMG Third Report] (discussing the legitimacy
of CESR's participation in the transposition of directives into national laws in light
of the principle of subsidiarity). The Commission decision establishing CESR
refers to CESR's role in assisting in the transposition of directives only cursorily.
See id at 28.
230. See supra notes 151-69 and accompanying text.

231. See infra notes 232-35 (discussing the confusion created by the
proliferation of EC authorities).
232. See FinalLamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 15-16 (noting that there are
40 national regulators with authority to supervise securities markets in the E.U.);
see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing reorganization of
financial market supervisors at the national level).
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Member States only to find that there is no supervisory authority to
implement and enforce the legislation. 233 The Wise Men noted that
the disparate competences of the securities authorities in E.U.
Member States would make it particularly difficult for newly minted

EC advisory bodies to construct harmonization measures capable of
effective implementation by all the concerned securities
authorities. 234 Given that some E.U. Member States have reformed
their financial markets supervisory authorities in an ad hoc fashion to
respond to the mandate to implement legislation that is essentially
foreign to their national securities regulation regime, there is a
danger that a confusing web of implementing authorities will spring
up throughout the E.U. as a response to EC securities legislation and
235
increase regulatory compliance costs.

The uncertainty that accompanies such regulatory restructuring
poses the danger of reducing the effectiveness of EC legislation at
fostering the necessary convergence among technical rules that
ultimately apply to securities market participants. 36 As convergence

233. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Casefor a European Securities Commission,
38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 23 (1999) (stating that Germany was two years
late in implementing the Insider Trading Directive because it did not have an
appropriate administering authority for insider trading regulation). Germany
created the Federal Supervisory Authority for Securities Trading as a consequence.
See id. Before these reforms Germany had no statute prohibitive of insider trading.
See id. at 22 n.61.
234. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 15-16 (urging convergence
among regulatory structures).
235. See Eddy Wymeersch, The Implementation of the ISD and CAD, in
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND
BEYOND, supra note
169, at 40 (distinguishing between prudential and

transactional supervision, and noting that E.U. Member State implementation of
EC Directives has tended to place prudential supervisory authority in the hands of
banking regulators, while a variety of agencies have appeared in E.U. Member
States to administer provisions relating to transactional supervision of securities
market participants).
236. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 37-38 (stressing the need for
knowledgeable regulatory authorities for the effective implementation of securities
harmonization legislation). The Lamfalussy Report also called for the involvement
of market participants in the harmonization process and suggested that private
entities act as a sounding board for the adequacy of harmonization measures
among states. See id. The involvement of market participants in regulatory
convergence was a crucial element in the success of the Euronext exchange model.
See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Euronext business
model).
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among technical rules is the crux of harmonizing EC securities
regulation, it is imperative that the national administering authorities
also achieve similar outcomes in terms of the enforcement of those
rules. 237 Because rule enforcement is to a considerable extent a
function of regulatory philosophy, and because different agencies
have different embedded constituencies and approaches to
regulation, the national level structure of securities authorities likely
will have an effect on the success of EC securities regulation
harmonization efforts. 3 8
The collaborative framework of the Euronext Regulatory MOU,
however, minimizes these concerns. Collaboration among regulators
has external "network effects" that encourages convergence in
approaches to regulation.23 9 Convergence in enforcement and
regulatory philosophy, as opposed to mere harmonization of
applicable law, is a necessary component of EC securities law
harmonization as well.2 40 Although cooperation under the auspices of
CESR provides the opportunity for encouraging convergence in these
areas, that forum has the drawback of implicating EC Treaty
237. See Ferran, supra note 15, at 304-05 (suggesting that the role of national
regulatory authorities will shift once the ESC and CESR have garnered more
influence in EC regulatory decisions and that in the future the national authorities
will resemble administrators rather than rule makers).
238. See Global Markets, National Regulation, Cooperation: Statement Before
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 12-14 (2004) (statement of
Ethiopis Tafara, Director, Office of Int'l Affairs, SEC) (noting that the substantial
differences in regulatory philosophy between the United States and E.U. Member
States may work to the detriment of cross-border capital flows); see also Ethiopis
Tafara, Director, Office of Int'l Affairs, SEC, The SEC's Experience in the
Development of an Integrated Securities Market in the United States, Speech at the
Second Annual European Financial Services Conference (Jan. 27, 2004), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch012704et.htm (noting that the differences
among regulatory philosophies of the E.U. Member States derives from the
countries' divergent pasts). Newer Eastern European Member States likely have
substantially underdeveloped regulatory philosophies as their securities markets
have existed for little more than a decade. See id.
239. See infra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing regulator
"networking" and associated influences on regulatory convergence).
240. See IIMG Third Report, supra note 229, at 25-28 (discussing the extent to
which CESR is charged with applying "peer pressure" to regulators to converge
their approaches to securities law enforcement). Disparities amongst national
regulators in enforcement of harmonized securities laws easily can give rise to
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, which is exactly what harmonization is
supposed to eliminate. See id. at 10.
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subsidiarity concerns. Cooperation under the Euronext Regulatory
MOU does not implicate these concerns.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
I recommend that the SEC and the Euronext College clarify the
reach of provisions related to regulatory convergence among NYSE
Euronext markets in the recently penned Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation, and the
Exchange of Information Related To Market Oversight ("NYSE
Euronext MOU"). 2 4I Next, I suggest additional arrangements that
E.U. Member States can undertake to employ market participants in
regulatory convergence efforts in the E.U. Finally, I attempt to shed
light on the important role that the Euronext Regulatory MOU and
similar arrangements can play in facilitating dialogue among
European regulators and developing the administrative capacity of
European securities authorities.
A. THE NYSE EURONEXT MOU MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH THE
HARMONIZATION PROCEDURES OF THE EXISTING EURONEXT

REGULATORY MOU

On September 26, 2006, Chairman Cox of the U.S. SEC met with
the Chairman's Committee of the Euronext College to discuss the
regulatory issues raised by a combined NYSE Euronext. 242 The SEC
and the Euronext College reiterated their assessment of the
regulatory implications of the merger and stated that they foresaw no
"spillover" of exchange regulation from the United States to
Europe.2 43 But such assurances are an inadequate basis on which to
build an industry subject to pervasive and costly regulation,
especially when that industry is the cornerstone of national

241. See

Memorandum

of

Understanding

Concerning

Consultation,

Cooperation, and the Exchange of Information Related To Market Oversight U.S.

SEC-College

of

Euronext

Regulators

(Jan.

25,

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-8_mou.pdf

2007),

available at

[hereinafter NYSE

Euronext MOU].
242. Press Release, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Chairman,
Euronext Regulators Meet to Discuss Cooperation in the Event of the NYSE
Euronext Combination (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news
/press/2006/2006-165.htm.
243. See id.
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economies. 244B NYSE Euronext and the exchanges that might follow
its path need more certainty from regulators regarding the extent to
which they may be exposed to future cross-border regulation. The
fact that NYSE Group and Euronext are willing to enter into a
merger that gives rise to uncertain risks of costly regulatory
"spillover" demonstrates how big the stakes are in this merger.
In an attempt to address these concerns, the SEC and the Euronext
College authorities 245 concluded the NYSE Euronext MOU on
January 25, 2007.246 The MOU contains standard enforcement
information sharing, 247 market surveillance,241 and confidentiality
provisions. 219 The MOU also states that it is not binding.250 On its
face, the NYSE Euronext MOU appears to resemble traditional SEC

enforcement MOUs.

244. See, e.g., Ajay Shah & Susan Thomas, Securities Market Efficiency, in
supra note 117, at 145-46
(discussing the constraints that illiquid securities markets pose to the efficient
distribution of capital in developing economies).
245. See NYSE Euronext MOU, supra note 241, art. 6, 7 29 (listing the
signatories of the MOU as the Chairmen of the regulatory authorities comprising
the Euronext College and the Chairman of the SEC). However, all consultation,
cooperation, and exchange of information pursuant to the terms of the MOU is
bilateral-between the SEC and the Euronext College-which implies that the
Euronext College will become the contact point for the SEC whenever an
enforcement or supervision issue pertaining to NYSE Euronext arises. See id. 10.
Thus, the NYSE Euronext MOU appears to constrict the independent regulatory
authority of the European regulators even further because transatlantic requests for
assistance with respect to NYSE Euronext must now be made between the SEC
and the Euronext College pursuant to the terms of the NYSE Euronext MOU. See
id.
246. See Press Release, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC,
Euronext Regulators Sign Regulatory Cooperation Arrangement (Jan. 25, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-8.htm (stating that the
MOU will take effect when Euronext Paris S.A. announces the acceptance of the
NYSE Euronext offer).
247. See NYSE Euronext MOU, supra note 241, It 20-21 (delineating how
information sharing requests are to be executed).
19 (expressing regulators' agreement to develop practical
248. See id.
arrangements to coordinate regulatory oversight of NYSE Euronext's integrated
functions).
249. See id. $t 22-27 (delineating permissible uses of information obtained
pursuant to the MOU).
250. See id T 7.
GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS,
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But the NYSE Euronext MOU contains provisions regarding
convergence of trading markets regulation as well. 251 Specifically,
the MOU contemplates coordination between the SEC and the
Euronext College on the harmonization of trading rules across NYSE
Euronext markets. 2 However, whereas the NYSE Euronext MOU
appears to defer to NYSE Euronext's initiative in the harmonization
of trading rules, 25 3 the Euronext Regulatory MOU was premised on
the general EC imperative to harmonize securities regulation and the
obligation that regulators undertook to work towards this goal.254
Consequently, the Euronext College has hitherto played a lead role in
the harmonization of trading rules.2 5 But with the advent of this new
relationship between the SEC and the Euronext College, it is an open
question as to who bears the initiative in the harmonization of EC
securities trading markets regulation: the combined NYSE Euronext,
the Euronext College, or the SEC.256

It is important that the NYSE Euronext MOU, and the SEC in
particular,257 do not interfere with the harmonization framework of
251. See NYSE Euronext MOU, supranote 241, 18 (providing for coordinated
decision making in market supervision).
252. See id. 18(a) (stating that harmonization of trading rules is an area of
coordination, but that coordinated decision making under the MOU is not limited
to the areas outlined in the MOU).
253. See id
18 ("Where NYSE Euronext and its Markets seek to harmonize
their rules, the Authorities will work together to coordinate their regulatory
approval processes and to facilitate the development and implementation of
consistent rules, where appropriate.").
254. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, pmbl., art. VII,
7.1
(stating that the regulatory authorities will make their "best efforts" to harmonize
domestic regulation).
255. Cf Wymeersch Working Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (remarking that
arrangements for "contractually organized supervision" have achieved
convergence of standards that is beyond the minimum harmonization contemplated
by EC securities directives).
256. See generally Jordan & Majnoni, supra note 117, at 259-79 (comparing
"government-induced" and "market induced" models of financial market
integration and concluding that market forces alone do not achieve an optimal
harmonized regulatory regime because market-led harmonization tends to promote
forms of competition that undermine financial stability).
257. See Raustiala, supra note 80, at 32-33 (explaining that the SEC's
international training programs have the side-effect of promoting U.S.-style
securities regulation); see also Nnona, supra note 137, at 203-04 (arguing that the
SEC tends to use umbrella regulatory fora such as IOSCO to spread its regulatory
agenda, just as it did with the "exportation of U.S. insider trading laws").
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the Euronext Regulatory MOU-otherwise the harmonization of EC
securities trading market regulation could suffer a setback.258
Ultimately, the incentives that once drove Euronext to pursue active
harmonization of regulation with the Euronext College could
diminish in a combined NYSE Euronext entity because the control
dynamic in the new company will change.25 9
Euronext and its new management and board will
intra-European securities regulation harmonization
is unclear.26 But the E.U still has an unequivocal

European

exchange

consolidation

because

Whether NYSE
continue to push
after the merger
interest in intra-

of the significant

efficiencies that European capital markets have to gain from such
consolidation.2 6 Thus, it is in the interest of the E.U. to make it clear
that cooperative arrangements such as the Euronext Regulatory
MOU remain open to market participants to facilitate the
consolidation of markets and convergence in regulation. 62
As a defense to this uncertain regulatory regime, the combined

NYSE Euronext is implementing an innovative device, including a
"material adverse change of law" clause, that the company will

258. See Campos, supra note 21 (reflecting on the possibility of a transatlantic
exchange merger prior to the announcement of the NYSE Euronext deal, and
suggesting that "no country is going to allow its primary market to be foreign
owned and/or overseen by a foreign regulator without a fight"). Commissioner
Campos did suggest, however, that the creation of a holding structure could
mitigate the "problem" of foreign ownership. See id. In fact, the holding structure
is exactly what NYSE Euronext has opted for. See NYSE EURONEXT PROSPECTUS,
supra note 51, at 60.
259. See Cohen, supra note 67, at 13 (noting that regulators desired change in
board seat allocation in the combined entity to ensure proper regulatory balance).
The Dutch Finance Minister had threatened to withhold the approval of the Dutch
AFM if he could not obtain a European voice in the appointment of the board of
NYSE Euronext, which is incorporated in the United States. See id.; see also
Nicolas Paraise, NYSE's Euronext Deal Gets Positive Dutch Signal, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 8, 2006, at C3 (withdrawing the Dutch threat of veto of deal conditional on
assurances to prevent U.S. regulatory creep).
260. See Aaron Lucchetti, Meet the Big(ger) Board - SEC Is Close to Clearing
Way for NYSE-Euronext Merger, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at Cl (stating that the
NYSE, pending the closure of the NYSE Euronext merger, has already begun to
pursue interests in exchanges in India and Tokyo).
261. See generally Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 9 (describing the
potential efficiency gains realizable from the integration of European financial
markets).
262. Cf id. at 8 (stating that the E.U. has no "divine right" to the benefits of an
integrated capital market, but must actively build the integrated market).
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trigger for protection against costly increases in regulation resulting
from changes in U.S. or European law.2163 This device consists of a
Delaware trust in the United States and a Dutch foundation in the
Netherlands that is empowered to take action to "mitigate" the effect
of U.S. or European extraterritorial regulation that has an adverse
effect on NYSE Euronext exchanges or the issuers listed on those
264 The primary duty of the trustees
exchanges.
of the Delaware trust
and the board of directors of the Dutch Foundation "shall be to act in
the public interests of the markets operated by Euronext and NYSE
Group, respectively, and their respective subsidiaries if and only to
the extent necessary to avoid or eliminate a material adverse change
of law. '265 The remedies available to the Delaware trustees and
Dutch board for curing the effect on a market of an adverse change
in securities law in any relevant jurisdiction include the assumption
of limited management responsibilities necessary for (a) changing
the rules of the relevant securities exchange; (b) altering the terms of
listing agreements on an NYSE Euronext exchange; (c) altering the
terms of contractual arrangements with financial services providers
operating on NYSE Euronext markets; (d) changing information and
communications technology employed in the markets, and; (e)
changing clearing and settlement arrangements on NYSE Euronext
markets.2 66 Interestingly, the market supervision areas in which the
Dutch foundation and the Delaware trust have power to undertake
remedies bear a remarkable resemblance to the areas of cooperation
26 7
identified in the Euronext Regulatory MOU.
The arrangement nevertheless begs the question of why it should
be necessary for NYSE Euronext to create a structure that is in nature
adversarial towards the community of regulators when the regulatory
framework that created the conditions for the success of the stock
exchange at the center of this merger-Euronext-was
263. See NYSE EURONEXT PROSPECTUS, supra note 51, at 114-21 (outlining the

"material adverse change of law" clause in the merger agreement and the potential
effects of it).
264. See id.at 114-15.
265. Id.
266. See id.at 117-18.
267. Compare id., with Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. V. Part II
of the Euronext Regulatory MOU addresses the supervision of clearance and
settlement activities, but that portion of the Euronext Regulatory MOU is not
publicly available. See id.recital 7.
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fundamentally non-adversarial and, indeed, cooperative. 268 The fact
that the SEC's philosophy of securities regulation is substantially
different from that of its counterparts in Europe supports the
conclusion that a combined NYSE Euronext will change the dynamic
of regulatory cooperation at the transatlantic and intra-European
level.Z69
It is not clear what effect the new NYSE Euronext MOU will have
on the continued operation of the Euronext Regulatory MOU. 27 0 It
must be recalled in general that the SEC's approach towards MOUs
is that they are not binding instruments and create no obligations on
the part of the signatory regulators. 7 ' But, as I have argued in this
Comment, the Euronext Regulatory MOU essentially functions as a
mechanism for filling gaps in EC securities legislation. Whereas the
regulatory framework of the Euronext Regulatory MOU involved the
active cooperation of Euronext market regulators and Euronext
towards the harmonization of trading market rules, the defensive
devices embodied in the Dutch foundation and the Delaware trust
suggest that a different approach towards securities law cooperation
and convergence might emerge as a consequence of the NYSE
Euronext merger and the less ambitious approach to regulatory
2
convergence of the NYSE Euronext MOU. 11

268. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, pmbl. (setting forth a
coordinated and cooperative approach to regulation and supervision of the
Euronext markets).
269. See, e.g., MOLONEY, supra note 1, at 8-9 (stating that the E.U. has not yet
articulated a clear regulatory philosophy). On the other hand, statutory regulation
of securities in the U.S. dates back to the 1930s. See id. at 3-4.
270. Compare Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, art. XI,
11.5
(permitting other regulatory authorities to become party to the Euronext
Regulatory MOU), with NYSE Euronext MOU, supra note 241, art. 2,
11
(providing that the scope of cooperation under the MOU could be expanded in the
future in the event of alterations in the increased integration of NYSE Euronext
markets). For example, it is an open question whether regulators from jurisdictions
to which Euronext expands in the future will prefer to join the SEC-Euronext
College MOU, or the Euronext Regulatory MOU, or both.
271. See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting
various SEC MOUs).
272. Compare Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, pmbl., with NYSE
EURONEXT PROSPECTUS,

supra note 51, at 114.
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B. CESR SHOULD ADOPT A MULTILATERAL MOU THAT WILL
FACILITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COOPERATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS AMONG REGULATORS FOR FUTURE MERGERS OF
EUROPEAN STOCK EXCHANGES

Euronext's experience in collaborating with the Euronext College
to harmonize trading markets rules has shown that, while the benefits
to be achieved from an integrated market are substantial,273 the
27 4
process of harmonization itself is time-consuming and costly.
Euronext has incurred much of this cost on its own because of the
significant competitive advantage that it stands to gain from a
harmonized regulatory structure.275 But other market participants
may not arrive at the same conclusion when evaluating the costs and
benefits of pushing for regulatory convergence in the E.U.
jurisdictions in which they operate.276
The obvious question that this poses is who should bear the cost of
harmonizing national rules among E.U. Member States. Luckily, this
question also has an obvious answer: the E.U. should bear this
273. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 9 (describing the potential
benefits from market integration and the attendant opportunity cost of foregoing
such integration).
274. Cf Raustiala, supra note 80, at 58-60 (discussing the cost of establishing
regulatory institutions in less developed economies). The adoption of pre-existing
regulatory regimes, as opposed to setting out to develop new ones, mitigates the
problem of developing a corpus of law to interpret the new rules. See id at 59.
275. See EURONEXT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at i-ii (discussing
"regulatory risks" and warning that Euronext's trading market integration efforts
run the risk of late implementation because of the time-consuming approval and
consultation process in the Euronext College).
276. See Vincent Boland & Francesco Guerrera, FSA Staff Brand iX Plan 'A
Nightmare', FIN. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at 1 (stating that the plan for merging the
LSE and Deutsche Borse was doomed because of the difficulty of harmonizing
trading rules in the U.K. and Germany). The example of the failure of iX
demonstrates that regulators must be willing to exert additional effort to harmonize
regulation, while market participants must be willing to take the risk that those
efforts will not achieve a level of harmonization sufficient to make their endeavor a
success. See Poser, supra note 28, at 502-04 (stating that the iX project failed
partly because of the "incompatibility" of U.K. and German exchange regulation).
The question, however, is not whether the regulation of Member States is
compatible, but rather, how to harmonize that legislation in accordance with EC
directives. See After iX, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 24 (stating that the U.K. and
Germany established six working parties to examine the issue of harmonizing
trading rules). Although the iX plan was defeated by shareholders, the
harmonization work should have proceeded. See id.
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cost. 2 77

The difficulty is creating a mechanism to transfer to the E.U.
the cost that market participants incur while collaborating with the
national regulatory authorities that are leading the harmonization
effort.278 It must be borne in mind that market participants do incur
substantial costs-ultimately, regulation seeks to change the
behavior of industry on the premise that such regulation enhances
social welfare. In changing the regulatory structure of the market, the
authorities create and withdraw business opportunities and thereby
reward and punish participants in the market.
In light of this relative lack of clarity as to who bears the cost of
harmonization efforts, CESR's proposed standardized MOU for the
supervision of trans-European market participants 279 appears to be a
worthwhile initiative. A standardized regulatory MOU would ease
the doubts of market participants as to the feasibility of new ventures
that are heavily dependent on the harmonization of regulation.2 80 It
would create more certainty in the market regarding regulators'
commitment to harmonization.2 1 The MOU should employ the
bifurcated Committee mechanism of the Euronext Regulatory MOU
and arm's length 28 2 collaboration with the regulated entity.

277. See Final Lamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 104 (arguing that the E.U.
legislation needs to be updated and revised to promote greater harmonization
without "additional unreasonable costs").
278. See 11MG Third Report, supra note 229, at 24-25 (calling for a mandatory
cost-benefit analysis of proposed internal market legislation in conjunction with
consultations with market participants). Cf Himalaya Report, supra note 41, at 21
(citing the absence of provisions that permit a home authority to delegate a
supervisory responsibility to a host authority in instances where such delegation
would be more cost-effective than abiding by the home country control principle).
279. See Himalaya Report, supra note 41, at 14 (listing such a standardized
MOU as a potential tool for supervisory convergence that CESR would study at a
future date).
280. Cf supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the iX
venture due to doubts about the possibility of successfully harmonizing German
and U.K. trading rules).
281. See id.
282. See Euronext Regulatory MOU, supra note 12, arts. I-II, paras. 1.3, 2.2,
3.2 (describing the manner in which the College obtains information from
Euronext regarding proposed measures that are subject to prior approval and nonopposition by the College).
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C. EUROPEAN REGULATORS SHOULD EXPLOIT THE CONSULTATIVE
FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS THE
EURONEXT REGULATORY MOU TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY IN E.U. MEMBER STATES
283

The popularity of the SEC's International Institutes
demonstrates the importance of cross-pollination in international
securities regulation. 84 In EC securities regulation, CESR serves as a
forum for E.U. Member State securities authorities to advise the
European Commission on proposed securities legislation and to
collaborate on the consistent implementation of such legislation. 85
CESR thus provides an indispensable venue for regulator
"networking. '

28 6

But arrangements such as the Euronext Regulatory

MOU provide a mechanism for the actual implementation of the
changes that must be made to the existing national legislation to
achieve the harmonization outlined in EC directives.287
One can see the indirect benefits of the collaborative rule
harmonization efforts of the Euronext College in the increased
understanding of regulators of the divergences among national
regulatory regimes and increased awareness of the role of important
283. See Raustiala, supra note 80, at 32-35 (stating that in the year 2000
approximately 460 staff members from securities authorities throughout the world
had received training through SEC programs).
284. See Slaughter, supra note 132, at 293 ("Information networks promote
convergence through technical assistance and training, depending on how they are
created and who their most powerful members are. Indeed, some regulatory
information networks have an explicit agenda of convergence on one particular
regulatory model."). The SEC's International Institutes are indeed framed with the
explicit agenda of convergence on the U.S. model of securities regulation. See id.
285. See FinalLamfalussy Report, supra note 7, at 31 (describing the "two hats"
of the proposed committee). The Lamfalussy Committee proposed the creation of
CESR on the basis of the then-existing FESCO. See id.
286. Cf Raustiala, supra note 80, at 24-26 (describing the advantages to
regulators of loose networks, as opposed to formal international organizations, as a
forum for developing regulatory capacity because the members of the network
generally share common interests).
287. Cf Mogg, supra note 154, at 78-79 (stating that CESR has a secretariat and
convenes every three months). The Euronext College, on the other hand, conducts
harmonization efforts on an ongoing basis through working parties that are
established to assess the changes in law that are necessary in each Member State to
achieve a harmonized trading market regime among the Euronext jurisdictions. See
supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Euronext College
Chairmen's Committee, Steering Committee, and Working Parties).
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market participants in other Member States.28 8 Further, where
regulators work closely with market participants on the
harmonization of regulation, as in the harmonization of Euronext
trading market rules, the bifurcated Committee mechanism of the
Euronext College functions to prevent regulatory "capture"2 8 9 and,
thus, minimizes the problem of "race to the bottom."2 90 Thus, fora
such as the Euronext College serve a indispensable role. The E.U.
should encourage Member States to exploit such arrangements to
facilitate the development of administrative capacity in E.U. Member
States with a less developed securities regulation regime.

CONCLUSION
Euronext merged the stock exchanges of Amsterdam, Brussels,
and Paris in 2000 to take advantage of the increasingly harmonized
regulatory regime for securities markets in E.U. Member States. But
at the time of this merger there were gaps in EC securities
legislation, particularly with respect to the harmonization of
securities trading markets regulation. The Euronext College
responded to this regulatory challenge by creating a mechanism for
the harmonization of trading markets rules in the jurisdictions in
which Euronext operates. The mechanism employed in the Euronext
Regulatory MOU parallels the harmonization framework of existing
EC securities directives. As an instrument for cooperation the

288. See Speech by Michael Foot, supra note 83 (remarking on the importance
of the bilateral MOU in fomenting a closer relationship between regulators). The
Director of the FSA suggests that the "existence of such a document means that
there has been at least some due diligence done on both sides about each other's
system and that the results have been broadly satisfactory. It often means that it
will be easier to pass regulatory information without challenge. It generally means
that . . . the regulators from the two sides get together[,]

and discuss the

performance of each other's economy and of their major financial institutions.
Over time, regulators can and do start to build up the personal relationships that
really make a difference when a difficult live case comes along." Id.
289. See Di Giorgio & Di Noia, supra note 36, at 479-80 (discussing how the
adoption of a single E.U. financial market regulator might increase the risk of
regulatory "capture"). Regulatory capture occurs when a government regulatory
authority becomes beholden to the business interests of the market participants that
it is charged with regulating. See id.
290. Cf Raustiala, supra note 80, at 60 (suggesting that regulators feel more
secure in their approach to regulation when other successful regulators utilize a
similar approach).

450

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[23:387

Euronext Regulatory MOU thus represents a significant evolution
beyond the non-binding MOUs of the SEC and IOSCO. The
arrangement also serves as an excellent example of successful
reregulation in the wake of deregulation and increased competition.

